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PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS?
LABOR UNIONS, TAX POLICY, AND
POLITICAL VOICE EQUALITY
PHILIP T. HACKNEYt
"The function of democracy has been to provide the public with
a second power system, which is an alternative power system,
which can be used to counterbalance the economic power."
E.E. Schattschneider
INTRODUCTION
Labor unions are weak politically and continue to decline in

number and political power in the United States.' Many contend
that this is a positive development for the country because they
believe labor unions cause economic harm.2 Others see this loss

as unfortunate and harmful because the decline of labor comes

t James E. & Betty M. Phillips Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
Law Center. J.D. LSU Law Center, LL.M., New York University School of Law. A
big thanks to the LSU Law Center for a grant making this work possible, and to my
research assistant Vivian A. Jeansonne. I also thank the participants in the 2016
Junior Tax Law Conference, the participants of the 2016 Critical Tax Law
Conference, the participants of the 2016 Law & Society Conference, the students and
faculty at the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Advanced Topics in
Tax Policy Colloquium of Fall 2016, and the students and faculty of University
California Irvine School of Law Current Issues in Tax Policy and Law Colloquium. I
especially thank Alice Abreu, Pippa Browde, Neil Buchanan, David Cameron, Adam
Chodorow, Charlotte Crane, David Elkins, Lilian Faulhaber, Jon Forman, Daniel
Hemel, Sarah Lawsky, Francine Lipman, Omri Marian, Goldburn Maynard, Philip
Postlewaite, Emily Satterthwaite, Erin Scharff, Walter Schwidetsky, and Manoj
Viswanathan for their thoughts on earlier versions of this paper.
1 Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and Political
Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1638,
1641 (2014); PHILIP YALE NICHOLSON, LABOR's STORY IN THE UNITED STATES 279-

36 (2004) (anecdotally detailing the declining power of unions from 1968-2004); KAY
LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN ET AL., THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: UNEQUAL POLITICAL VOICE
AND THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 87-94 (2012) [hereinafter
UNHEAVENLY CHORUS].
2 MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COST OF LABOR LAW
187-88 (1987); F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMICS

280-94 (1967).
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with a reduction in working class benefits and opportunities, and
also because it exacerbates economic inequality.3 These forces
battle over policies focused on the ease of union organization and
maintenance such as right to work laws and union shops. While
these are important policies for labor union power,' this Article
examines labor union tax treatment instead. The Article focuses
primarily on whether we should grant exemption from federal
income tax to these interest groups, but also considers whether
labor union members should be allowed to deduct labor union
dues. In evaluating these questions, this Article focuses on the
value of groups in our democracy in a social choice function
model, rather than on the economic benefits of labor unions in a
social welfare function model.' A review of labor union tax
treatment suggests that we systematically undermine the
important voice of labor in our democracy. This Article proposes
some changes to tax policy related to labor unions as a result of
this review.
In this Article I consider two somewhat divergent income tax
policies: the tax treatment of labor union income and the
deductibility of labor union dues. The first raises the issue of
whether we should tax the economic activity of a particular legal
business entity. The second raises the issue of whether certain
individual expenditures should offset income for tax purposes.
Both issues raise, as a primary matter, whether the expenditures
or income represent "real income." I argue labor union revenue
is real income, and that therefore its exemption should be
justified by some policy goal.' In other words, there is nothing
special about the income earned by labor unions that makes it
entitled on its face to exemption from income tax. Conversely,
Jordan Brennan, United States Income Inequality: The Concept of
CountervailingPower Revisited, 39 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 72, 72-73 (2016).
" Patrick Flavin & Michael T. Hartney, When Government Subsidizes Its Own:
Collective BargainingLaws as Agents of PoliticalMobilization, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI.
896, 896 (2015).
See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 20-21 (1989) (discussing the different possible constructions someone might
mean by political equality, with one focused on maximizing a social welfare function,
and another primary theory focused on maximizing a social choice function).
6 See generally Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About
Tax Exemption, 33 VA. TAX REV. 115 (2013) [hereinafter Talk About Tax Exemption]
(arguing that all mutual benefit organizations, such as labor unions, should be
presumed to be taxable unless there is a strong policy reason for subsidizing the
activity).
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because labor union member dues payments represent an
amount that reduces income of the labor union member, we
should allow the deduction in the ordinary course of business
unless there is a legitimate reason for not allowing that
deduction.
In evaluating these two policies, I adopt a social choice
function model. Under this model, we should maximize the
number of individuals who have an opportunity to express their
As a very simple and
voice to influence our democracy.
incomplete example, if there were 100 people in a particular
democracy, and we said that only 25 had the ability to influence
the final decisions, a policy that increased that number of
individuals to 30 would improve the social choice function. The
incompleteness of the example is the question of the quality of
the voice. If the new five now speaking are only reiterating the
voice of the 25 already speaking, then there is no real
enhancement to social choice function. In this Article, I struggle
to assess when social choice function is enhanced by this policy
but do my best to suggest a way through the problem with the
limited information at our disposal.
Importantly, the influence at issue in political voice is more
than an opportunity to vote for representatives; it includes the
opportunity to engage in policy discussions and influence final
decisions on governmental policy. As I will develop in the Article,
in a large and modern democracy, a polyarchy, the primary
means of obtaining political voice for most citizens is through
interest groups. Thus, the question becomes, where we can
identify a group that suffers from a particularly weak political
voice, should we and could we consider enhancing that political
voice through public policy.
When viewed through this social choice function model, it
becomes difficult to justify current policy regarding the
deductibility of union dues. Under the tax law, an employee can
only deduct unreimbursed business expenses to the extent they
exceed two percent of her adjusted gross income. Because labor
7 Although
labor union dues are generally considered a deductible trade or
business expense under 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014) of the Code, because labor
union members are employees they are typically unable to deduct labor union dues
either as an above the line deduction under 26 U.S.C.A. § 62 (West 2014), or as an
itemized deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012); instead they generally may deduct
these expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the extent those
amounts exceed two percent of the members adjusted gross income.
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union dues are considered unreimbursed employee business
expenses, union members are rarely able to deduct them. A
business owner generally faces no such challenge in deducting
his own association dues.' Given the political voice inequality
that exists between these two classic interests in favor of the
businessman's political voice, it is hard to justify making that
differential worse through the tax system. To improve the social
choice function, we should at the least make the two deductions
equivalent by denying or allowing both. I explore the pros and
cons of these choices in Part VI.
The case of tax exemption for labor unions is more complex
under this social choice function model. It depends on other
policy choices made. For instance, if other interest groups are
provided tax exemption-the current status quo-then the case
for labor union tax exemption is overwhelming. It is only fair to
extend the exemption to labor interests if business interests
benefit from the policy. Denying labor exemption would decrease
the social choice function by reducing the voice of labor in a
relative sense, compared to other political voices that the policy
would enhance, such as that of business.
However, labor interests are better off in a state where all
interests are taxed. The problem of collective action makes it
more difficult for large, relatively poor, and less skilled interests
like labor to form, as compared to smaller, wealthier, more
skilled interests, like those that form in the business context. In
other words, exemption as a benefit is much more likely to be of
assistance to business interests in any case than labor interests.
Many business interests get a windfall from this exemption from
tax. Taxation is likely to be more of a hindrance to the better
capitalized business interests. Based on this, I argue the social
choice function would be increased under this taxable state
because labor interests, as a relative matter, would not
experience the same type of reduction in voice as would other
more powerful interests who would now have to pay tax on

' Some have objected that this is a much broader problem. We widely make it
difficult for all employees to deduct unreimbursed employee business expenses. The
fact that labor union members are unable to deduct their dues is simply a narrow
instance of this problem. I argue later in the Article that the labor union case is
more significant because of its direct impact on political voice. In other employee
business expense cases, this issue is not close to the fore.
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income. Thus, we could improve our current tax policy simply by
rescinding tax exemption for both labor and business interests,
and maybe others as well.
Finally, the collective action challenge of labor in theory and
practice is so severe that a policy of tax exemption for labor
interests alone could be justified as a modest attempt at righting
political voice equality in our democracy. In a social choice
function sense, providing a subsidy to labor interests, while not
providing the subsidy to others, like business interests, could
bring more voices into the political debate. However, as will be
developed below, the case for this is not strong. The policy
instrument provides meager support and is not well-tailored to
accomplish this purpose.
Our current tax-exemption system9 generally allows any
group that wants to form a non-profit organization to form and
obtain tax-exempt status. 10 For instance, Congress exempts
many special interests from federal income tax, such as trade
associations, social welfare organizations, and labor unions." No
one has offered a strong theory supporting this policy to subsidize
groups that work to influence our political system. Given the
attempts we make to limit the ability of interest groups to
influence our elections and policy generally,1 2 this choice is odd.
While providing charitable organizations a subsidy can be
justified in part on the fact that they provide public benefits,
labor unions are little involved in provision of direct public
benefits. As mutual benefit organizations, they look to advance
their members' interests through negotiating with management
and seeking their wants through the political process.
To evaluate the idea of tax exemption generally as it applies
to labor unions, I consider the major non-profit tax-exemption
rationales. I find them important, but unsatisfactory, because

9 26 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2014).
"0 There are limits of course. A particular company cannot form a business
league to support its own product. It must instead form to support a line of business.
None of the tax-exempt interest group organizations can engage primarily in
political campaign activity.
11 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(4)-(6) (West 2014). These are respectively social welfare
organizations, labor organizations, and trade associations. Although the Code refers
to labor unions as labor organizations, I will refer to "labor unions" in the rest of the
paper.
12

(2005).

ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 2-6
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they all fail to consider the important value of political voice
equality. Market-failure theory suggests we should subsidize
organizations that offer goods or services subject to market
failure.1 3 While we can show a market failure in the case of labor
interests generally, the theory fails to tell us what type of market
failure is necessary to justify the subsidy. Government failure
theory suggests we allow nonprofits to provide collective goods
and services that the government fails to provide." This theory
focuses on goods and services that are not critical to the
functioning and decision-making of the government itself.
Interest groups, however, are fundamental to the government
structure itself. Government failure theory fails to consider
whether there might be a different quality and importance to
such services. Pluralism theory considers the deeply political
nature of much of our nonprofit tax exempt sector; it contends
that we should exempt nonprofit organizations from tax to
facilitate democracy. The central idea of this theory is the more
political voices we highlight, the better off our democracy. The
theory, however, fails to consider that many nonprofit interests
face little to no collective action problem. Those organizations
with greater wealth and skill are likely to face less of a collective
action problem and also more likely to draw a greater return
from the subsidy. Thus, the subsidy will work to enhance the
voice of those already strong. This enhancement is likely to work
to drown out weaker voices.
There are many theoretical or functional lenses through
which we could view these nonprofit organizations. We could
look at the impact they might have on our economy in a
functional sense such as how the presence of labor unions impact
We could then assess in a
the distribution of resources.
theoretical sense whether the presence of labor unions results in
a more fair distribution of resources. However, I contend that
viewing them through a functional lens, such as viewing them in

13 Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from the Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67-70 (1981) (most clearly
articulating contract failure theory).
14 Burton Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a

Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 21 (Susan

Rose-Ackerman ed. 1986) (most clearly articulating government failure theory).
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their interest group role, and through a theoretical lens, such as
the governance role they play in our democracy, provides the
most significant and important insights to our tax policy.
I have previously examined tax-exempt business leagues
through the lens of interest group literature." An interest group
is "a collection of individuals or a group of individuals linked
together by professional circumstance, or by common political,
economic, or social interests" that satisfies three requirements:
(1) the organization is not a political party, that is, the name of
the organization does not appear on a ballot; (2) it uses some of
its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or executive
decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized
outside of the government it intends to influence.16 Viewed as an
interest group primarily, we can see that business leagues do not
face significant collective action problems and cannot be shown to
face some other significant market failure to warrant tax
exemption. 7 Just as a matter of its place in the marketplace,
there is no indication that there is any general lack of business
interest groups.
Labor interests are also interest groups, but they present a
different case. Theory suggests a large, latent interest like that
of labor should experience high difficulty in organizing to provide
the collective goods of representation before government and
bargaining with employers."8 Evidence shows that labor is highly
underrepresented politically. In a study from 2001, labor made
up only one percent of the interest group sector. 9 That was
compared to business nonprofit interest representation of twenty
percent, and business corporations at thirty-five percent. There
is, thus, evidence that a severe market failure hinders labor from
representing itself in the market and before government in a
comparative sense. This suggests that current tax exemption
policy generally has it backwards. Instead of providing every
group exemption we should tailor exemption only to those groups
16 Philip T. Hackney, Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus: Why Section 501(c) (6)
Trade Associations Are Undeserving of Tax Exemption, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 265, 269
(2015) [hereinafter Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus].
16 JOHN
R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING,
CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INFLUENCE 22-23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted).

" See Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15.
'I MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 57-59 (20th prtg. 2002) [hereinafter COLLECTIVE ACTION].
19 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl.11.3.
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that really need the assistance. Additionally, generally denying
labor union members the ability to deduct union dues is likely to
directly harm political voice equality where business interests so
readily have access to that deduction.2 0
This Article contributes to the tax legal literature by
providing an analysis of labor unions and how we tax them.
Although labor unions as a whole are a very small part of our
economy and tax system, by looking at one narrow section of the
tax-exempt sector we can shed light on the rest of the exempt
sector.
Additionally, although most tax policy scholarship
focuses on one of three values-equity in an economic sense,
efficiency in an economic sense, and administrability-I focus
primarily on the value of equity in a governance sense.
I argue that, at least in the sphere of tax where tax choices
directly impact our democracy, we should take into consideration
values of democracy. In that sphere, we should not adopt tax
policies that increase political voice inequality. Also, it is
reasonable to adopt tax policies that increase the equality of
political voice. Because I find that our current taxing system of
interest groups broadly increases political voice inequality, I find
our tax system wanting and make recommendations for change.
Part I covers the tax
The Article proceeds as follows.
treatment of labor interests. Part II begins to build a social
choice function model by sketching the case for democracy and
thereby political equality. Part III completes the social choice
function model by highlighting the role of groups such as labor
unions within a democracy and evaluates the role groups play in
the matter of political equality. Part IV describes the history and
tax law of labor unions. Some who are unfamiliar with the taxWhen looking at a tax subsidy, it is important to consider whether the person
who is named as the beneficiary of the deduction will be incentivized by that
deduction. That question is the question of who receives the incidence of the subsidy.
That question depends on the elasticity of a union member to paying union dues.
Given the substantial challenge in organizing unions, it seems likely that, at least as
an initial matter without the consideration of any other laws, labor union members
are highly elastic as to whether they will pay union dues or not. Their return is
unclear and is often unlikely to exceed the annual cost. Where there is a union shop,
however, that requires union members to pay union dues whether they want to
belong or not, the answer is obviously different. Nevertheless, the primary other
party that might receive the incidence of the money gained through the deduction
would be the union itself, meaning that the question of who gains the incidence of
the deduction does not matter if all we care about is whether the policy would
increase union activity or not.
20
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exemption requirements of labor unions might want to jump to
Part IV.B for a discussion of that area of the law first. Part V
assesses theories regarding the rationale for exempting nonprofit
organizations. Part VI analyzes the implications of democratic
group theory for the tax treatment of labor interests.
I.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF TAX TREATMENT OF LABOR
INTERESTS

This Part looks at the technical tax treatment of labor union
income and the payment by members of labor union dues. There
are three primary types of labor union income: (1) member
income, (2) nonmember income, and (3) investment income.2 1 An
initial question is whether the "income" exempted is "real
income" that should in the ordinary course of an income tax be
taxed. Because there appears to be a real transaction in a
commercial space between individuals and a legal entity to
acquire services or goods from that entity, the income exempted
seems to be real income that should ordinarily be taxed in our
economy; any decision to exempt that income should be
supported by a policy intended to incentivize this activity. Labor
union dues are considered at the end of this Part.
A.

Member Income

Labor union members pay member dues to the union. Those
dues entitle members to certain rights and benefits that have a
value." For instance, in exchange for the dues, the union might
engage in collective bargaining on behalf of the employees and
might also defend an employee who has a dispute with
management. In effect, the labor union provides services to its
members in exchange for a fee just the way a health club
provides services to its members in exchange for a fee. Because a
labor union is a separate legal entity from its members, this
transaction should result in income to the labor union for the
purposes of the income tax.

Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 268.
Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizationsfrom FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 354 (1976)
21
22
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U.S. tax law treats a corporation as a legal entity that is
separate and apart from its members.2 3 Under that theory, when
a member pays dues to a union in exchange for certain goods and
services he is dealing with a legal entity that is separate from
himself. Generally, our income tax law has treated such a
moment as a moment to recognize income for tax purposes.24
However, some do not accept member dues as income of the
nonprofit.2 5 They argue that the nonprofit corporation is no more
than a place where nonprofit members are pooling income to do
things nonprofit members could do on their own. The idea is that
neighbors A, B, and C could pool money to construct a tennis
court. A, B, and C would then each pay the costs of maintaining
the court. We should not suddenly tax A, B, and C as an entity
simply because they are carrying on activity together. Utilizing
this characterization to describe a large complex organization
like a union that is an interest group delivering collective
benefits seems questionable. The key aspect of interest groups is
that they form because no member could provide these collective
goods and services on his own. The entity and collective action of
members joined together is necessary for its power. There is a
real difference between the member and the organization.
Even if you accept the pooling income argument, not all
member income is easily placed into that category. When a
union sells goods or services that are not core goods or services of
the union, we might think of this income differently. Thus,
where a union sells education, insurance, or death benefits to its
members, we might think of it differently than when it sells
collective bargaining with an employer. In the end, unions sell
See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
However, there is a real question as to why we would apply a tax to a
corporate entity. A corporate entity is a legal fiction, after all. I take a look at that
question in Talk About Tax Exemption, supra note 7. There I argue that the two best
theories are the shareholder theory that holds we tax corporations to tax the
shareholders, and the real entity theory that suggests the corporation is a thing that
has power that can be regulated through taxation. Both of these theories could
arguably apply to a labor union, making it a good subject of taxation.
26 See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 343 (discussing the idea that
we might view church congregations as only pooling resources rather than selling
services); David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and
Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW 451, 455, n.6 (2014) (discussing that legislators adopted
the tax exemption scheme for social clubs in order to not impose harmful tax
consequences on those who choose to pool their resources together to engage in
recreation); Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV.
133, 134 (2006).
23
2
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services that differ little from normal business activity that we
apply the income tax to in most other situations. Members pay
dues to acquire collective bargaining with an employer, magazine
subscriptions, management grievance protection, and some
lobbying and political activity. We should justify why we would
diverge in income tax treatment for this type of financial
arrangement.
B.

Nonmember Income

A union generates nonmember income when an individual
who is not considered to be a member pays the union for goods or
services.2 6 For instance, some unions sell health insurance to
those who are not members of the union. This type of sale
results in nonmember income to the union. The union realizes
income to the extent the amount paid exceeds the costs of that
good or service. Most theorists consider this income as income
that should be taxed in a normal income tax system. Exemption
of this income is effectively a subsidy to the union to the extent
we do not tax it. With other mutual benefit nonprofits-social
clubs, for instance-Congress rightly taxes such nonmember
income. 27
C.

Investment Income

Investment income is the return from stocks and bonds or
other capital investments.2 8
Most theorists also accept the
exemption of this income as a subsidy to a nonprofit
organization. An individual cannot generally invest income and
avoid the income tax on the return from that investment. In
effect, allowing tax exemption for a particular purpose allows the
creation of a communal tax-free investment vehicle for that
purpose in the same way we allow individuals to establish taxfree savings vehicles for retirement or education for their
children.

26

See Halperin, supra note 25, at 136.

27

26 U.S.C.

28

Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 293.

§ 513 (2012).

326

D.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:315

Impact of Tax Exemption

The regime of tax exemption encourages a nonprofit to hold
earnings beyond a taxable period. This is because tax exemption
only provides a subsidy to the extent there are earnings and
those earnings are not immediately spent within a particular
taxable year.
Additionally, exemption primarily provides a
benefit of the deferral of tax, rather than permanently exempting
income from tax. Union expenses are generally deductible unless
they are used for lobbying or political activity. To the extent that
the union holds earnings from one year to the next, the main
issue would be that the union was able to deduct the amount
early.
Of course, this does not take into consideration the
different tax rates involved between union members and the
corporation, or different tax rates over time, or the fact that
union members change over time.
If a union were taxable, it could avoid tax, or at least lower
its taxable income, by ensuring revenues and expenses closely
match. This may be difficult for a union because they typically
act in part as an insurance service to the extent they hold strike
funds or provide other insurance-like benefits to members.
Additionally, any organization that is looking for stability values
maintaining some savings. Thus, many unions would likely hold
some percentage of profits into a future year.
E.

Taxation of Union Dues

A union member's payment of dues generally is a deductible
business expense. 29 However, most union members are unable to
deduct this amount. Union dues are a miscellaneous itemized
deduction.3 0 Such a deduction can only be deducted to the extent
all similar deductions exceed two percent of the individual's
adjusted gross income. For instance, a union member with
$60,000 in adjusted gross income can only deduct union dues
along with other miscellaneous items to the extent all of those
items exceed $1,200. If that union member pays $400 in union
dues, but incurs no other miscellaneous itemized deduction, he
will not be able to deduct the amount. Even if the union member
gets past this hurdle in part, the standard deduction is likely
29

26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012). However, dues used for lobbying or political campaign

activity are not deductible under § 162(e).
30

26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012).

PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS?

2017]

327

greater than the union member's total itemized deductions,
meaning, again, that the union member will not be able to deduct
this business expense.
The comparison to the businessman's trade union dues is
important. As a business expense, those dues are deductible
immediately from gross income above the line. There is no
itemizing for the businessman. His income in most instances
reduces his gross income.
It is quite possible that because union members generally
cannot deduct their union dues, labor interests are collectively
overtaxed rather than undertaxed. I will return to this point in
Part VI when I analyze the case for how to tax labor interests.
II.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ROLE OF

GROUPS THEREIN

Most normative income tax scholarship focuses upon either
an economic efficiency or economic fairness dimension to model
an ideal system or to critique the current one. It asks whether a
tax system is the most economically efficient or the most
economically fair to different groups and classes of people.
Nevertheless, in this Article I primarily critique our tax system
on the dimensions of democracy and political voice equality. On
economic fairness, many utilize an entitlement or welfarist model
to assess policy."1 On economic efficiency, scholars often use the
Pareto-or Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency of a competitive market as a
model to assess policy.3 2 We lack a model to assess political
fairness in a democratic system.3 3 This Part, thus, begins to
sketch a model of an ideal democratic system so that we can
better assess current policy. I return again to this modeling in
Parts III.D and Part VI.

1' Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1915 (1987).
32 Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX
REV. 39, 62
(1996).
33 See, e.g., David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience:
Market Salience and PoliticalSalience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 80 (2011) (discussing the
lack of a baseline to assess a neutral political system); David Lowery et. al., Images
of an Unbiased Interest System, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y. 1212, 1212-13 (2015)
(discussing that individual participation can be modeled on one-person one-vote, but
that a pluralist group system lacks any coherent baseline upon which to judge
whether it is unbiased).
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Many elements of our tax system directly impact our
democracy. The choice to adopt a progressive tax, the choice to
impose an estate tax, the choice to apply a corporate tax, and the
choice to exempt some organizations from that tax all impact our
democratic system by impacting the political voice of various
citizens and entities. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the tax
system's impact on our democracy, even in one small part of the
system, in order to evaluate the income tax impact on democracy
more broadly.
Should political voice equality be the sole or primary driver
of income tax policy? No. Imposing confiscatory taxes to try to
ensure perfect political voice equality is likely both problematic
from an efficiency standpoint and American norms of fairness.
While striving towards democracy is critical to a fair society,
there are other important factors critical to assessing a tax
system, including its economic fairness and efficiency.
The
democracy-enhancing nature of a policy is only one factor in
analyzing a tax system. In the case of tax exemption and
interest group dues, though, it is a particularly important factor,
and maybe even the defining factor.
This first part sketches the necessary conditions of
democracy, discusses why democracy, and focuses closely on the
element of political equality.3 4 A model of an ideal democracy
allows us to critique its current form in the United States and to
assess whether our choices of taxation impact our democracy in a
positive or negative way. Finally, it examines the role groups
play within that system. Some might question the need to detail
why democracy. However, many have different conceptions of
what democracy might mean, and this effort will help clarify the
terms of democracy. Additionally, some do not really believe in
democracy after all. The Founders themselves, for instance, were
highly distrustful of unfettered democracy and designed a system
to combat against a majority taking complete control. Someone
who does not believe democracy to be the right form of
government may also not accept the conclusions of this Article.
34 In sketching this account of democracy, I rely heavily upon the work of Robert
Dahl. In particular, I rely upon: ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS

(1989); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998) [hereinafter ON DEMOCRACY];
ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2003);
ROBERT A. DAHL, ON POLITICAL EQUALITY (2006) [hereinafter ON POLITICAL
EQUALITY].
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How and Why Democracy?

The fundamental question in considering politics is how the
group is going to decide what to do. In other words, who gets to
determine what is in the best interest of the group, the
association, the state? The simplest and most direct answer to
this question is: "Among adults no persons are so definitely
better qualified than others to govern that they should be
entrusted with complete and final authority over the government
of the state."" To put it more positively, we can make the moral
judgment that all people are of equal, intrinsic worth and,
therefore, ought to have an equal say in deciding what the group
is going to do. Professor Robert Dahl refers to this as the
principle of "intrinsic equality."" Once one accepts this moral
judgment about individuals, there are a series of principles that
lead to some form of democratic government. Democracy is an
imperfect system that is littered with contradictions; and yet, if
one accepts the basic principal of intrinsic equality, democracy
appears to be the best choice.
A
What are the ideal requirements for a democracy?
democracy must allow all individuals an opportunity to
participate in discussing options before a decision is final.3 ' That
opportunity must be equal and real. All individuals in the
democracy must have an equal vote in any final decision.3 8 All
the members must have an equal and real opportunity to
examine and understand both the policy being considered for a
That understanding
vote and all reasonable alternatives.3 9
should include an appreciation of the consequences of the
decisions. Similarly, all members must be involved in setting the
agenda of the association.4 0 Finally, all competent individuals in
the association, which generally means all adults, must have
these rights.4 1 To the extent any of these requirements are
missing, political equality will be lacking.42

ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 34, at 4.
36

Id.

' ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 37.

8 Id.
3 Id.
40
41

Id. at 38.
Id.

42

Id.
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To highlight what this means it is useful to consider the two
and
alternatives
to
democracy-anarchism
primary
guardianship.4 3 A theorist who falls into either of these camps is
much less likely to be persuaded by the arguments in this
Article, because the argument depends largely on an acceptance
of the principles of democracy. They may still support the case in
part because many of the principles are similar.
In a highly simplistic sense, an anarchist wants to maximize
human freedom and believes that a state is the primary inhibitor
of human freedom." The fundamental principle of anarchism is
that state coercion is evil.4 5 Thus, even if a state employs a
democratic process to make rules and to enforce those rules, the
anarchist will find that state illegitimate because it also uses
coercion. The anarchist believes the state should be run by
voluntary organizations instead of through a democratic
process.46
Thus, an association or state following anarchist
principles that wants to follow some form of democracy needs
complete unanimity to take action.
The anarchist criticizes democracy by pointing to the harm of
minority coercion. This is a problem for the democratic theorist
because he likewise does not believe it right for someone else to
make choices for another. Like the anarchist, he believes that
Thus, the anarchist critique puts the
coercion is wrong.
democratic theorist in a bind. In a democracy, the majority
makes the choice for a demos and thereby coerces a minority.
The anarchist critique calls into question whether majority rule
is just.
How does democracy withstand this critique? The answer is
twofold. First, the democratic theorist notes that anarchy is
impractical and maybe impossible. Second, he accepts that the

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 37.
" Id. Anarchism is a very loosely held together system of thought. For a decent
discussion of it as both a theory and a movement, see APRIL CARTER, THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF ANARCHISM (1971), http:/www.ditext.com/carter/anarchism.html (in
particular, see Chapter 2, Anarchism and the State).
46 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 37.
4 An anarchist would presumably fully support tax exemption for any nonprofit
organization and would likely try to get as many aspects of our economy into that
sector as possible, in order to erase as much of the state as possible. A libertarian
4

would likewise be highly supportive of robust tax exemption for nonprofits. In both
instances, though, they would expect those entities to be completely voluntary.
4 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 37.
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coercion of the minority is problematic but argues that the
democratic system, among governmental systems, results in the
least amount of coercion.
There are significant problems to the practicality of the
anarchist case. A key belief of the anarchist is that humans can
successfully
work
together
solely
through
voluntary
organizations. They believe it is possible to operate a complex
society with absolutely no coercion.
However, there are no
credible examples of such a government succeeding.4 8
Additionally, there are two theoretical problems with the
anarchist solution. First, anarchists must believe that without a
state there would be no coercion.49 If they are right, then they
have a good case; but, based on almost all written history, it
seems reasonable to conclude that coercion is ubiquitous among
humanity. In a society without a state, the strong will almost
certainly take advantage of the weak. If it can be shown that you
are likely to have less coercion via a democratic state, then the
anarchist argument under a utilitarian analysis should fail even
under anarchist theory. Second, most anarchist approaches
depend upon some form of coercion to overthrow the original
state.50 Thus, even anarchists accept the coercion of others to get
to a better moral situation.
The democratic theorist uses the anarchist's acceptance of
coercion to support democracy. If coercion is acceptable to get to
a better state, presumably coercion might be just if it could be
shown that this particular coercion allowed a state to maintain
the least amount of coercion. The democratic theorist argues we
achieve the least amount of coercion in a state where a majority
controls the decisions of the state, and we also maximize the
social choice function.51 Perhaps the most potent critique though
remains that unless an anarchist's utopian vision of a society
without coercion can exist, the anarchist vision is simply
unworkable.

48

Id. at 46.

49 Id.

so Id.
s1 Id. at 45.
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Guardianship, unlike anarchism, is a practical alternative to
democracy.
Plato most famously proposed this form of
government in The Republic.52 There he argued that we should
establish a society that trains a class of people who are
exceptional individuals in that they are both wise at governing
and able to put the interests of the public ahead of their own
interests. B.F. Skinner also, in a more modern sense, made a
case for governance by psychologists. 53 A guardianship theorist
holds two primary beliefs: (1) most people are incapable of
governing, and (2) society can locate and train a small group of
highly governance-capable people."
Guardianship thrives
because many instinctively believe there is some class of people
that is qualified to govern, and conversely, that most people are
not capable of governing.
The guardianship theorist finds no problem supporting the
first proposition. Any review of the voting records of citizens,
their competence regarding basic civic facts, and their lack of an
ability to think of more than their own self-interests makes a
pretty powerful statement regarding the supposedly limited
ability of most people to govern.66 It is the second proposition
that is problematic. Proponents of guardianship must be able to
also make the case that there are individuals who we can identify
and properly train to wisely rule. The proponent argues that
because we already pick individuals to perform highly complex
tasks there is no reason we cannot do the same for the task of
governing." For instance, we identify and train physicians to
perform tasks that are very difficult and subject to matters of life
and death. There is no reason to believe we could not do the
same for our rulers argues the guardianship theorist." However,
to make the positive case, we must be able to find this small
52 See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Francis
MacDonald Cornford trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1970) (n.d.).
" See generally B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (2007).
4 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 59.
' See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY
DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2008) (making the case that most Americans
are so ignorant of economic policy that they are not capable of governing on matters
of economics); cf MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 13 (2012) (arguing that although the
governing capabilities of most Americans are very low, they have enough capacity to
govern themselves).
56 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 62.

* Id. at 62-63.
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minority of individuals with the moral, instrumental, and
practical knowledge to govern, and these special people must be
able to genuinely put the public ahead of themselves. This seems
highly implausible.
If we reject guardianship as impractical or impossible, can
we justify the principle of intrinsic equality? It is the building
block of the democratic idea. It justifies the ability for us to
accept that all adults in the group are capable of governance.
The formation of the United States as a democracy of course
relied upon this principle in the Declaration of Independence.
But as suggested above by those who advocate guardianship, it is
by no means self-evident that all people are created equal. We
all differ in ability both intellectually and physically. These
differences might allow someone to reasonably conclude that
there are individuals who should govern because they have
particularly strong capabilities in that regard.
Nevertheless, there are still good reasons to accept the
intrinsic equality principle. First, almost all religious traditions
and ethical traditions operate on this principle." Second, as
explored in part when considering guardianship, all other
principles are weaker." Those who are in the glorified category
of superior are almost certainly convinced they are correct, but
the others who are not considered superior are likely to disagree.
It is the
Third, the principle is supported by prudence."
principle that best ensures we are treated as fair as possible.
Finally, although perhaps guilty of circular reasoning, the
principle is likely to be acceptable to more people than any
Again, the principle maximizes the social choice
other."'
function.
The principle of intrinsic equality leads to a conclusion that
political equality or political voice equality are necessary to any
Dahl labels this value "inclusion."62
just political system.
Political voice equality means everyone in the group must have
the opportunity to discuss potential policies, set the agenda, and
vote on final decisions. John Stuart Mill spoke clearly on this
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 66. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 291 (expanded ed. 2005).
59 ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 66.
18

` Id. at 67.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 76.
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point within a representative governmental context when he
chastised the British government for failing to include the
workingman in the decision making. Mill said:
[Dloes Parliament, or almost any of the other members
composing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the
eye of the working man? When a subject arises in which the
laborers as such have an interest, is it regarded from any point
of view but that of employers of labor?"
This critique still has powerful resonance today as we will see
when we review what the political voice of labor looks like today
in the United States.
Beyond the principle of intrinsic equality, the other
fundamental matter to democracy is the decision-making process.
A democracy operates based on majority rule to maximize
possible political equality in final decisions. In a utilitarian
sense, the procedural rule of decision making based on majority
rule should insure that the greatest number of people get their
The rule should maximize the
way on a particular policy.
amount of freedom of the individuals of an association or state to
govern themselves. However, the challenge is what to do if the
majority adopts a rule that hinders some of the identified
necessary elements of a democracy.
Once a final decision is made by majority rule, there will be
some who did not get their choice. This is fine in most cases.
But, if the majority eliminates a fundamental right-or rightsof the citizens of a democracy, then we no longer have a
democracy. The typical solutions to this problem are that we
develop a populace that respects the norms of democracy, or we
establish an undemocratic means of enforcing fundamental
This particular
rights-a Supreme Court, for example."
connundrum is not for this Article to solve. However, the other
challenging but integrally related question is considered in the
next Section. How should we operationalize the ideal democratic
principles into a modern, large state? This, after all, is what we
have in the United States and is the more relevant issue for
considering the place of a labor union in our democracy.

6

JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 67

(New York, Harper & Brothers Publishers 1869).
6
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 155, 173.
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Application of Ideal Democracy to the Large Modern Statethe Problem with Groups

B.

Ideal democratic theory is utopian in nature. Once a group
is too large, it is impractical to achieve ideal democratic
conditions. Providing ten people a real opportunity to speak,
consider, and decide is a much different proposition than
providing such rights to one thousand people, much less one
millon people. In a large state, political voice equality simply
becomes impossible.
Many factors lead to this problem:
(1) differing abilities and resources; (2) scarcity of time for
individuals; (3) numerosity; (4) the fact that the market impacts
so many decisions; (5) the existence of international systems that
impact our democratic choices; and (6) the reality that crises will
occur.65
These factors mean that certain individuals or
organizations with greater skill, money, or time will have greater
capacity to influence the agenda, the information, and the final
decision of a large state. It means that we will likely stray far
from the ideals of democracy we have already identified. We will
lack political voice equality among citizens.
Nevertheless, ideal democratic theory provides a model for
large democratic states to develop institutions that mimic the
goals of the ideal democratic state. To achieve something close to
democracy in large, modern democratic states, or polyarchies 6 6 :
(1) elect representatives of the people; (2) conduct elections
regularly with fairness and without coercion; (3) guarantee
freedom of speech, particularly on matters of criticizing the
political system; (4) provide robust "[a]ccess to alternative
sources of information" outside of the governmental regime;
(5) allow associations, including political parties and interest
groups, to form with ease; and (6) allow all adults to fully
participate in all of the five freedoms listed above.
These institutions seem self-evident. Because there is no
way to operate a pure democracy in a polyarchy, electing
representatives becomes the only functional way for the society
to govern itself. To obtain accountability of representatives, a
polyarchy must adopt frequent elections.
Perhaps, most
critically, freedom of speech, information, and association become
6 ON POLITICAL EQUALITY, supra note 34, at 50-51.
6
67

DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 117.
ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 85-86.

6

Id. at 95-96.
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the foundations of democracy.
These measures ensure that
everyone has at least an opportunity to participate in
information-gathering and agenda-setting. While citizens will
not generally get a say in final decisions made by their
representatives, at least they are never shut out of the discussion
if these institutions are maintained.
However, do these five fundamental rights identified above
ensure political voice equality necessary in ideal democratic
theory? No. While implicitly found throughout those rights,
none of those rights mandates a right to political equality.
Because of the large size of the demos and the number and
complexity of issues before the demos, most citizens will have no
opportunity to participate in understanding the issues before the
demos or in developing the information about alternative
policies. Critically, citizens who are not a representative get no
vote on final decisions of the demos, and most citizens will have
only limited opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process. Political voice equality in its ideal sense simply cannot
exist in a polyarchy.
Nevertheless, a natural solution might exist. Groups of
individuals with political interests might speak to political
representatives on behalf of citizens to equalize citizen voice.
The pluralists of the 1940s and 1950s argued that interest groups
solved the problem of political voice equality. In the pluralist
view, interest groups form for every possible citizen interest and
express the voice of those many interests to representatives.
Are they right?
While the pluralists present a relatively positive vision of
group activity in a democracy, there is a distinctly negative
vision of interest groups in American thought. Many say that the
problem with the governance of the United States is that those
interest groups are instead "special interests" that harm
democratic equality. In this vision, special interests control our
representatives and thus our government for the benefit of some
elite. Interest groups cause harm to our democratic system
69 See
JOHN GAVENTA, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND
REBELLION IN AN APPALACIAN VALLEY, 5-7 (1982) (discussing the one dimensional

vision of power of the pluralists Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby suggesting that the
American political system allowed anyone who wanted to express their voice to
express it). Cf. ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY:
AUTONOMIES VS. CONTROL 207 (1982) (denying any pluralist actually ever held this

facile of a notion of pluralist theory).

PROP UP THE HEAVENLY CHORUS?

2017]

337

because they pursue selfish special interests rather than the
common public interest. 70 Professor Jeffery Berry says "there is a
widespread popular perception that interest groups are a cancer
spreading unchecked throughout the body politic."71
Group activity presents a challenge to a democracy. Each
group may represent a common interest as to its members, but
the group will present a selfish interest as to the demos. This
group activity then destroys the ancient political goal of
government seeking some common public good. In a polyarchy, it
is rare that we can find a common good. This is the pluralist
problem in a polyarchy. The principles of democracy require
even greater suffrage, and yet as those additional members come
into the demos, the irreconcilable conflicts become ubiquitous.
The democracy becomes a battle of groups for power rather than
a collective of people searching for a path to the common good.
In Federalist 10, James Madison warned of the dangers of
factions, which he defined as groups of citizens organized to
promote some common interest that is adverse to the rights of
other citizens or the common good of the polity. 72 Madison
believed a minority faction was not to be feared because the
majority could ensure through the simple power of numerosity
that the minority could not control.73 He feared that a majority
faction threatened the public good and the rights of citizens,74
and therefore thought pure democracy was susceptible to
tyrannical abuse by a majority.
Madison recognized, in a
70

JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCox, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 16 (5th

ed. 2009).
71 Id.
72 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (Yale Univ.
Press ed., 2009).
This point is important. Madison believed that there could be a single common will
or public interest. Today, most doubt the idea that a singular public interest exists.
In a polyarchy, there is a vast diversity of opinion as to the right direction for the
polity to take. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159 (expanded
ed. 2006) [hereinafter A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY].
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 72, at 50.
7 Although Madison was involved in forming our democratic constitution, he
seemed a proponent of guardianship. He genuinely believed there were some better
suited to govern than others, and thought that a Republic was the best way to go
about identifying those individuals. A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note
72, at 159. Madison was primarily concerned, as were many of his generation, and
prior governmental theorists, with the masses taking away property rights. Id. at

161.
7 When making this claim, he likely thought of groups like Shays' Rebellion.
DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND
PUBLIC OPINION 4 (Knopf ed. 1951).
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large country, some form of associational pluralism is necessary
to governance. 7
He believed that these factions could be
controlled by forming a large republic with elected
representatives of the people.78 He believed the large republic
and representatives would work to disperse the power of a
majority faction enough to protect the common public interest
from the selfish faction.
Unlike the pluralists, Madison seems to have built his
political theory on the assumption that a government should
work to try to accomplish a singular common good." In the
pluralist vision, there is no such thing as a common good for a
demos. The pluralist maintains that we should allow a diversity
of groups to seek their interests through government."' Rather
than interest groups being the problem of polyarchy to solve,
interest groups are the solution to the challenge of allowing all
citizens' voices to be heard. The common good is found in the
process of democracy, rather than in the results. In other words,
the focus is on a social choice function, rather than a social
welfare function.
Whether there is a common good or not, there are still real
problems with the pluralist vision and solution.
Pluralist
scholars Arthur Bentley and David Truman, in their early
writings, seemed to suggest that any interest that wanted to
form a group could in fact form that group.82 An interest is a
collection of individuals that holds an interest in the
governmental provision of some good, service, or policy. Those
citizens may hold that interest and never form a group. Or, they
may hold that interest and organize into a group.
That
organization may be formalized legally, or it might stay relatively
unorganized. In the simple version of pluralism, all interests
76 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 72, at 48 ("The latent causes of faction
are thus sown in the nature of man.").
77 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at 299; see also UNHEAVENLY
CHORUS, supra note 1, at 270-71.
78 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 72, at 51.

7 Id.
8 A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 72, at 160.
81 DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 34, at
295.
82 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 276. See Taxing the Unheavenly
Chorus, supra note 15, at 274-78 (discussing the pluralist vision); see also E.
PENDLETON HERRING, GROUP REPRESENTATION BEFORE CONGRESS 22 (Johns
Hopkins Press ed. 1929) ("Not only are almost all sorts of interests and classes
represented but also all sides of most questions as well.").
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face the same challenge in formation. Truman described interest
formation and mobilization like waves."
One group, like
veterans, might organize to successfully seek pension benefits
from the federal government. Postal workers might see that and
organize to generate similar benefits, and private employees
might seek such benefits too. Employers might then organize to
offset these new benefits. And so it goes.
Since the early work on pluralism, many have identified
E.E. Schattshneider
significant problems with the theory.
criticized the pluralist vision stating that "[t]he flaw in the
pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong
upper-class accent."' What he meant is that when we look at the
groups that organize and operate in our democracy, we find that
those groups overwhelmingly represent wealthy interests. This
is the collective action problem: Some interests, such as the
wealthy, are far more likely to organize and are far more likely to
be heard than the unorganized. This problem is discussed more
below in Part III. Additionally, there is no way to ensure
equality of political voice when citizen voices come through
different size and power groups.85 We will always come up short
on democracy when we operate through groups rather than
through all individual voices because groups do not equally
represent all voices. The problems with the group vision of
democracy do not stop there. Groups suffer from an agency
problem. Association leaders often speak for themselves rather
than for the will of the members. Finally, groups do not provide
the only method through which policy is made. Both elected
representatives and individual citizens can have a real impact on
our government agenda and decisions."
Thoughts on a Model PolyarchicalDemocracy
The significant lack of clarity in what an ideal polyarchy
might look like and the difficulty with using groups as a proxy for
individual political voice makes it difficult to model a just
C.

TRUMAN, supra note 75, at 59.
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960).
85 See UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 271-75.
8
8

' See, e.g., Arthur T. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and Interest
Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89, 8990 (1986).
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political system. Building a model upon pure democracy would
be the easiest. The principle of one person, one political voice
could be implemented by ensuring certain processes are always
followed to respect every citizen's right to participate in the
polity's decision making. But such a basis may be too simple for
a sophisticated model given the complexity of a polyarchy and the
relationship of groups to a polyarchy. Nevertheless, modeled off
of the one person, one political voice principle, we might make
some rough judgments that we could legitimately act upon.
For one, it seems reasonable to assume that there should be
some sense of balance in the interest group sector. To the extent
there is a lack of balance we might reasonably conclude that our
democracy is coming up short on political voice equality. This
model will have significant flaws, but it seems a workable
starting place to consider the difference in political voice equality
among groups and among citizens. If we are trying to maximize
a social choice function, we should not implement a policy that
exacerbate the political voice disparities between interests. We
might even try to enhance the political voice of some weaker
groups.
With this model in mind, the challenges presented by groups
in a democracy and the collective action problem in the specific
context of labor interests is considered in Part III. What is the
relative political voice capacity of labor as compared to business
interests and other groups?
III. LABOR UNIONS: COLLECTIVE ACTION AND
REPRESENTATIONAL PROBLEMS

Labor unions negotiate employment terms for all the
employees of a bargaining unit, provide strike pay for union
members on strike, and lobby and engage in politicking to obtain
the best laws for its members. Labor unions are fundamentally
an interest group that provides a collective good and service to
people who are employees." Labor union members tend to come
from lower to middle income families. Because of the collective
action problem discussed below there are reasons to believe labor
interests have a hard time organizing to advance their political
voice. The potential group of labor union members is large and
the return from organizing to each potential union member is
87

JAMEs

Q. WILSON, POLITICAL

ORGANIZATIONS 119 (1973).
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likely far less than the costs of joining. Furthermore, by law, to
act on behalf of labor, a majority of employees in a bargaining
unit must vote for a particular labor union. This means that
labor unions face a severe collective action problem."8
"[M]ovements by the 'powerless' require strong and
sustained outside support." 89 Hourly wage earners have long
faced great challenges acting collectively. Additionally, they
have little role or say in the acts taken by their corporate
employers. 0 Businesses made up of a few organizations that
possess money and skills tend to have a much easier time
organizing and representing their interests before the
government. 91 Thus, we should expect our political balance to be
skewed away from labor interests and towards business
interests.
This Part examines the collective action imbalance and finds
the political voice of labor as compared to some other interests
within our democracy to be particularly weak. ' This Part also
evaluates the composition of labor unions and finds that there is
not significant diversity of voices among different labor interests
or localities. Certain regions and occupations are much more
represented through this system. Finally, it looks at evidence on
whether unions represent a common will of their members. It
finds that there is evidence that the representation is biased to a
certain extent towards managers. This agency problem seems to
be consistent across the interest group domain. Thus, this Part
finds problematically that even if labor is representing some
labor voices, there are lots of labor voices that are left out of the
political system.

88

Id.

J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker
Movements (1946-1972), 42 AM. Soc. REV. 249, 251 (1977).
9 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283,
89

283 (1998).
91

Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 279.
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Collective Action Problem and Labor Union Evidence

The theory of collective action predicts that interests made
up of a small number of individuals under circumstances where
the return from the interest being fulfilled is high will be more
likely to organize than those interests held by many where the
return is small.92
Citizens who have a shared interest in some good or service
may desire to get their government to provide the good, service,
or policy.
If we assume that this citizen is the rational,
economically interested woman, when she looks at the question
of whether to seek from the government the provision of that
good, service, or policy she will make an economic calculation.
Will the return from her effort be greater than the cost? We can
also refer to this sought good, service, or policy as a collective
good. By that I mean that once the good is provided, it will be
provided to everyone. Thus, there will be a couple of challenges.
Generally, the return of these types of collective goods is going to
be smaller than the costs. Additionally, because the good is
available to all, there is a free rider problem.
Under Mancur Olson's theory, industries populated by few
players should be successful in organizing to seek collective goods
from the government while individuals with shared interests who
are vast, in quantity, like manufacturing workers, should
generally not be successful in such organizing.93 Similarly, we
should expect to see differences in ability to organize based on
human and capital resources. Those interests associated with
wealth and education are much more likely to organize than
those associated with poverty and lack of education. Evidence is
strong that the basic contours of these predictions hold.94 Small
wealthy groups form organizations with greater ease than large
disperse organizations with small value to each individual
member. However, the theory is not perfect. There is evidence
that some citizen movements organize more often than Olson's
theory predicted.95

9

COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 57-59.

Id.
94 See UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 319-20.
' Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America,
77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 390, 396 (1983).
9
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Large groups seem to solve the collective action problem
through three primary means: force of law, selective incentives,
or purposive incentives." Trade associations and unions are both
sometimes able to overcome the collective action problem by force
of law. For instance, a legislative body might pass a law forcing
those interested in working in a particular profession to join a
professional association, like a state bar, in order to work; in
"[S]elective
union parlance, this describes a "closed shop."
incentives" refer to selling a good or service that the seller can
exclude others from acquiring, such as magazines or insurance."
Finally, "purposive incentives" refer to incentives that provide no
value other than the moral value a member obtains because he
believes in the cause of the particular group.98
In his book, Olson considered labor unions and set forth his
theory of collection action. He found evidence of the challenge of
labor to organize in the history of the labor movement. Early
U.S. labor unions mostly consisted of local "small-scale
production" operations, like building trades, shoemakers, and
printers, rather than fields characterized as large manufacturing
operations." Olson thought this state of affairs was a result of
the fact that social benefits of the smaller unions were easier for
members to see. Nevertheless, over time there was a tendency
for the small unions to connect on a national level. Although
unions start small, there is a natural tendency towards local
unions organizing with a national union. Locals join national
organizations because the connection to a larger groups provides
real insurance effects. More importantly though, locals join a
national organization for the simple fact that an employer finds
it relatively easy to break a strike led only in one localized
union. 10o
As mentioned, one of the ways any interest can solve the
collective action problem is to get a law passed mandating those
interested in working in a particular job to join that organization.
To Olson, the predominant means by which large unions
overcame the collective action problem was by implementing
closed shops. There were some closed shops in early U.S. history,
9 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 277, 282.
9 Id. at 277.
" Id. at 282.
9
COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 66.
"oo Id. at 67-68.
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including carters in the 1600s, shoemakers in the 1800s, and
printers later in the 1800s.11
Problematically for unions,
Congress banned the closed shop in the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947,
as described in Part IV below.
Labor unions have also long offered various selective
incentives, such as insurance-related benefits, to attract
members. This might include death, unemployment, disability,
or old age benefits.10 2 Only large unions today tend to offer
significant benefits such as education, scholarships, and medical
care.1 03 The growth of government-provided benefits, such as
social security and unemployment insurance, have likely cut
significantly into the selective incentives a union can offer.
Finally, labor unions use "purposive incentives." In the case
of industrial, low-skilled, diverse workforces, it is thought that
the only purposive incentive that is effective pre-union shop in
organizing is "to be aroused by emotionally charged and
comprehensive appeals to their lot as a dispossessed class." 04
The Industrial Workers of the World represented many such
individuals in pre-union shop situations, and its many efforts led
to intense and often violent strikes.' 05
These purposive
incentives almost certainly continue to play a role in union
development and maintenance in the United States today. This
aspect of union organizing leads to one of the negative features of
unions: They tend to come with violence both from laborers and
employers.o6 Of course, to obtain any legal protections at all, a
union first must overcome the collective action challenge.
How does labor's political voice compare with other types of
interest groups in the interest group sector today? In an analysis
of the whole of the interest group sector at the Washington D.C.
federal government level in 2001, labor unions made up only one
percent of the interest group sector.' 0 Comparatively, business
interests towered over labor interests: Corporations made up
34.9%, trade and other business associations 13.2%, and

101 Id. at 69.
102

WILSON, supra note 87, at 124.

103 Id.

1" Id. at 128.

105 Id.

'0
See, e.g., PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 68-83
(1964) (discussing a particularly violent period of U.S. labor history).
107 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 321 tbl.11.3.
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occupational associations 6.8%.108 While there are many other
types of interests in our government that diverge from capital
versus labor, this suggests at least that something is out of
balance in this representational system. A review of the interest
group environment at the state level demonstrates this severe
imbalance as well. 109
What if we look at political representation as compared to
employment status? In 2001, the U.S. workforce comprised 64%
of the population.11 0 Different roles were filled in the following
ways: executives 9.6%, professionals 10.2%, white collar workers
18.4%, blue collar workers 24%, farm workers 1.5%, unemployed
3.2%, and not in workforce 33.1%.111 How were each of these
interests represented in the interest group sector? Executives
73.9%, professionals 17.3%, white collar workers 3.4%, blue collar
workers 1.1%, farm workers 1.7%, unemployed 1.2%, and not in
the workforce 1.4%.112
Again, the degree of inequality in
representation of organized interests compared to labor is
intense.
For labor, the story looks worse when viewed over time. The
decline over time of union political voice is significant. Labor
unions saw its representation in the interest group sector shrink
between 1981 and 2006.113 Meanwhile, the political interest with
the least amount of increase increased in number by 32%, and
the greatest sector increase was 883%, represented by health
interests.1 14 Labor unions thus shrunk from an already low 1.6%
of the interest group sector to just 0.8% of that sector." More
worrisome yet for labor as a matter of political voice is the
striking decline in labor union members in the workforce
described below in Section B.
Union testimony before Congress and electoral success is
also on the decline. The number of opportunities union staff has
to testify in front of Congress is highly correlated with union

108 Id.
109 David Lowery & Virginia Gray, The Population Ecology of Gucci Gulch, or

the NaturalRegulation of Interest Group Numbers in the American States, 39 AM. J.
POL. Sc. 1, 21 tbl.2 (1995) [hereinafter PopulationEcology].
110 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 329 fig.11.1.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113

Id. at 353 tbl. 12.1.

Id.
115 Id. at 356 tbl.12.2.
114
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density.11 6
Union congressional testimony has dropped
Likewise, scholars
consistently with membership declines.'
estimate that membership is the biggest determinant of electoral
success for a union.' Others show that a greater number of
members means more voters and more opportunities for financial
contributions.1 19 In a seminal lobbying study looking at the
trajectory of 139 issues over the years 1999 to 2002, the authors
described highly limited union representation before Congress. 1 20
They found that labor reresentation is quite shallow as compared
with other interests.121
Studies show that corporations, business associations, and
professional associations outspend labor unions in lobbying.
Labor averaged under $500,000 lobbying per union, while the
other three averaged all over $1,000,000.122 Additionally, while
corporations and business associations are very likely to have
highly connected lobbyists, labor unions seldom have such
officials represent their interests.1 2 3 Finally, while labor unions
have a higher average in political activity committee spending,
there are so many fewer of these unions that labor as a broad
interest is well outspent in this arena too. 12 4
One other line of study that is disconcerting for labor unions
is that interests trying to overcome the collective action challenge
may face a crowding out problem. 12 5 Virginia Gray and David
Lowery suggest that there is an ecosystem of interest groups that
is determinative of the size and scope of that interest group
116 Kyle W. Albert, An Analysis of Labor Union Participation in U.S.
CongressionalHearings, 28 Soc. F. 574, 587 (2013).
117 Id. at 586-87.
118 DEREK C. BOK & JOHN T. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY

153-55 (1970).
11' Marick F. Masters & John Thomas Delaney, Union Political Activities: A
Review of the Empirical Literature,40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 336, 344 (1987).
120 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS,
WHO LOSES, AND WHY 9-10 (2009) [hereinafter LOBBYING AND POLICY].

Id. at 10.
Id. at 200. However, Baumgartner and co-authors do not find a strong
connection between policy outcomes and resources. Id. at 203. Business seems to win
slightly more often, but not at a significant rate that would suggest their lobbying
expenditures caused the policy wins. Id. They do not argue this means money spent
on lobbying does not matter to policy outcomes. Instead, they believe that policy
wins of business and wealthy interests happened long ago and those advantages are
now simply a part of our political system. Id. at 212-14.
12
Id. at 200.
121

122

124

See id.

12

JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE NEW LIBERALISM 60 (1999).
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sector.12 6 Under population ecology theory, the number of a
certain entity type is dependent upon things that allow the entity
type to exist. Gray and Lowery state that "interest-group density
is set at an equilibrium level by the environment." 1 27 They find a
positive relationship between interest group size and population,
constituent interest in goods and services, the certainty of those
interests, the age of the interest system, and the size of the
government. 12 8 In the end, there are only so many organizations
a certain population can support. Once it has filled its capacity,
whether with environmental, business, and health organizations,
or charities, trade associations, and social welfare organizations,
the group system can run out of capacity to support more
organizations. Thus, if a policy works to enhance one interest,
that policy is simultaneously likely crowding out another group
in the process.
There is a caveat to the collective action research project.
The work must be understood in light of a problem present in all
of these studies1 2 9 : It is impossible to know what an unbiased
interest group sector would look like.13 0 The Schattschneider
vision of bias in the heavenly chorus is based on a baseline
As
interest group sector that is isomorphic with society.
Schlozman suggests, a reasonable baseline for comparing
organizational representation of interests is the one person, one
13
But, there is no reason to believe that groups
vote standard.a
would ever perfectly align in this manner. Because it is costly to
organize, many interests will never organize. Also some factors,
such as loss are far more powerful than other factors, such as
gain, in fomenting organization.1 32 Thus the dynamics of need for
organizational involvement should necessarily ebb and flow over
time, such that it should never be expected that organizations
exactly mirror individual interests.1 3 3
126

PopulationEcology, supra note 109, at 1.

127 Id. at 9.
121 Id. at 12.
129 David Lowery et al., Images of an Unbiased Interest System, 22 J. EUR. PUB.
POL'Y 1212, 1221-25 (2015).

130 David Lowery & Virginia Gray, Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in
Society and Before Government, 16 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5, 6 (2004) [hereinafter
Bias in the Heavenly Chorus].
131 Kay Lehman Schlozman, What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political
Equality and the American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1008-09 (1984).
132 Bias in the Heavenly Chorus, supra note 130, at 10-11.
"' Id. at 13.
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What Do Unions Look Like Today?

Unionization makes a difference to the bottom line of
workers. Union workers earn a premium, as compared to nonunion workers. Non-union workers earned seventy-nine percent
of the weekly median salary of a union worker. 13 4 But, unions
are quickly shrinking and we do not find unionization equally
across regions or job type.
In 2015, 14.8 million workers belonged to a union in the
United States."3 ' This made up 11.1% of the workforce. This is a
significant decline from 1983, when 17.7 million workers
belonged to a union, making up 20.1% of the workforce.13 6 And,
in 1954, 39% of the private sector workforce was unionized. 13 7
Public sector unions far outpace their private sector counterparts
today.
In 2015, over 35% of public sector workers were
unionized, compared with only 6.7% of private workers.138 In
fact, at the local government level, 41.3% of the workforce is
unionized.'
The protective service industries-police officers,
firefighters, education, and libraries-make up the largest sector
of unions today. 140 Union membership rates are highly statedependent, with New York exhibiting the highest rate of
unionization at 24.7% and South Carolina the lowest rate at
2. 1%.141
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") tracks data regarding
labor unions and other tax-exempt organizations, like business
leagues exempt under Section 501(c)(6). While this data is not
perfect because it only captures those organizations filing
applications and annual tax returns with the IRS and it depends
on the self-reporting of the entities, it does paint a relative
picture to consider. In that data, one can see a similar reduction
in labor unions particularly as compared to business leagues. In
looking at the rate of formation, it appears that for every one
labor union that forms, more than three business leagues have
134 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union
Members-2016 (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened
to the US Labor
Movement? Union Decline and Renewal, 25 ANN. REV. Soc. 95, 97 (1999).
"' News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 134, at tbl.3.

139 Id.

140
14

Id.
Id. at tbl.5.
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formed from 2005 to 2016.142 Additionally, the total number of
unions registered with the IRS has continually shrunk from
around 72,000 in 1990 to just under 47,000 in 2016.143 Business
leagues, on the other hand, increased in number from 1990 at
66,000 through 2010 at 92,000, then declined through 2016 at
64,000.'" Total assets and revenue recorded with the IRS in
Form 990 filings in comparison show a little cleaner picture.
While labor held about 70% of the assets held by business
leagues in 1990, it held only 54% in 2000, and then 46% in
2013.145 Total assets for labor unions rose from a little more than
$13 billion in 1990 to almost $37 billion in 2013. Assets just rose
more for business leagues from $19 billion to $80 billion over the
same period. Revenue of labor unions went from 67% of business
league revenue to only 51% of business league revenue from 1990
to 2013.
Union demographics have changed significantly over the
past 70 years. A study of the changing demographic trends in
labor from 1952 to 1999 shows a change of unionized nonagricultural workforce percentage from 33.2% in 1955 to 13.9% in
1999.146 In 2016, it was 10.7%. Although in the 1950s and 1960s
the union workforce was over 80% blue-collar, by 1998, whitecollar workers were the majority, making up 55% of the
unionized workforce.14 7 Although in 1952 almost 90% of union
members were male, in 1998, over 40% of union members were
female." That number kept increasing. By 2016, women made
IRS Data Books maintain that information from 2005 to 2016 on Table 24a.
See https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-irs-data-book. The rate is the author's
own calculation.
143 IRS Data Book 1990, tbl.25, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/90dbfullar.pdf;
IRS Data Book 2016, tbl.25, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soill6databk.pdf. As a result
of Congress passing a law in 2006 that forced small tax-exempt organizations to file
limited information with the IRS or lose their tax exempt status, the entire taxexempt sector began declining in 2010. However, the rate of labor decline was almost
continuous from 1990 to 2016.
1" As a result of Congress passing a law in 2006 in the Pension Protection Act
that forced small tax-exempt organizations to file limited information with the IRS
or lose their tax-exempt status, the entire tax-exempt sector began declining in 2010.
This makes the data a bit messier than it would otherwise appear.
145 SOI Tax Stats - Charities & Other Tax-Exempt
OrganizationsStatistics, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exemptorganizations-statistics (last updated Aug. 29, 2017).
142

146 HERBERT B. ASHER ET AL., AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS IN THE ELECTORAL
ARENA 26 (2001) [hereinafter AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS].
1
Id. at 28-29.

1

Id. at 30.
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up 46% of union members."'9 Although in the 1950s almost no
union members had any college experience, much less a college
degree, in 1996, 25% of union members had some college or were
college graduates. 150 By 2008, 37.5% of union workers held a
college degree or greater.15 1 Although in 1952 90% of union
members were white, in 1998, only 80% were white. 15 2 The
largest non-white group of union members in 1998 was
comprised of Hispanics.15 3 In 1999, black men had a higher rate
of unionization at 17.2% than whites at 13.5%, or Hispanics at
11.9%.154

Today, public sector unions are the dominant unionized
employee sector.
Teachers' unions, such as the National
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers,
make up a large part of that public union force.15 5 The American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees has also
demonstrated significant growth, from 250,000 in the mid1960s15 1 to 1.6 million by 2016.17 President Kennedy spurred the
growth of federal unions in 1963 when he signed Executive Order
10,988, which allowed public employees to engage in collective
bargaining. Public sector unions also vote at a much greater rate
than other sectors in favor of union certification.15 8
Although the legal environment in different states and
changes in different occupations impact this unequal
relationship, 159 there are likely other forces at work leading to
different unions being succeeding in certain businesses. For one,
it tends to be easiest to form unions where the employees sought
bear significant likeness in position, skill-level, location, religion,

News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 134.
AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 33. That percentage is
apparently the same as the general population.
'51 JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY
RESEARCH, THE CHANGING FACE OF LABOR 1983-2008,
at 1 (2009),
http://cepr.net/documents/publications/changing-face-of-labor-2009-1 L.pdf.
152 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 35.
1s3 Id. at 35-36.
1" Id. at 37.
1)6 PETER L. FRANCIA, THE FUTURE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN
149
150

POLITICS 55 (2006).

Id.
157 About AFSCME, AM. FED'N OF STATE, CTY., AND MUN. EMPLOYEES,
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Oct. 28, 2017).
156

16

FRANCIA, supra note 155, at 56.

1' Clawson & Clawson, supra note 137, at 97-101.
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or ethnicity. 16
Associations that are formed around one
occupation are more likely to form and survive than those of
more diverse interests.16 1
Once one brings in a diverse
population, the collective action problem becomes much more
severe.
In some countries, for instance, the union shop
agreement is not the norm at all, but the exception. There,
however, it appears that in many instances unions are held
together via some other unionizing force such as religionCatholic or anti-Catholic--or ideology-Marxist, socialist.' 62
C.

Do Labor Unions Represent the Common Will of
Membership?

In an article focused heavily on democracy, it is important to
discuss whether a union represents the interests of its members.
This raises the question again of whether it is possible to
Whether unions
generate some common good of a group.
represent the common interest of members or not should at least
implicate whether we think of them as advancing the cause of
democracy.
Not unlike the findings that our democracy is skewed
towards wealthier interests, 63 within interest groups themselves,
large patrons tend to sway the view expressed of many nonprofit
institutions.6 6 The wealthiest interests of business associations
tend to be the dominate influence over the interests for which
these groups decide to advocate. 6 5 I have not found evidence
demonstrating that labor unions suffer from this problem. This
160

WILSON, supra note 87, at 123; John Paul Ferguson, Racial Diversity and

Union Organizing in the United States, 1999-2008, 69 I.L.R. REV. 53, 55 (2016)
("[W]ork groups that win union representation are less racially diverse than the
population of work groups that initially filed the election petitions."). Many have
taken this basic fact to find that unions are antithetical to civil rights. However,
there is good social science evidence that unions can and have provided important
wins that foster civil rights, rather than hinder it. Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong,
"So Closely Intertwined": Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135,

1183-84 (2013).
161 WILSON, supra note 87, at 123; Shaun Bevan, Continuing the Collective
Action Dilemma: The Survival of Voluntary Associations in the United States, 66
POL. RES. Q. 545, 548, 553 (2012); see also HENRY HANSmANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE 22-23 (1996).
162 WILSON, supra note 87, at 121.
161 GJLENS, supra note 55, at 1.
164 Walker, supra note 95, at 401-02.
16' Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives
Trade Association Activity, 52 BUS. & SOC'Y 213, 219 (2012).
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may be because labor unions tend to be very dependent upon the
union dues model; they may not be able to use a significantly
increasing sliding scale fee schedule in the way that business
associations tend to adopt. Labor unions directly represent
individuals rather than institutions.
Does this mean that the leaders of unions are more likely to
represent the individual median members? While there are
indications that unions, at times, adopt relatively democratic
means of representation, the stronger evidence is that leaders
tend to diverge from the majority interest of union members, at
least in part. Of course, it may be more accurate to state that the
labor union members, like many people, are focused more on
their own economic situation than any outside politics.
Although I describe labor unions as interest groups, most
members do not join primarily for the interest group activities.
They join because the union negotiates contracts with
management and protects employees from unfair management
actions.16 6 One study suggests job security is the number one
motivating factor for joining a union.16 As Professor Moe states,
union members "stress economic benefits, they place high value
on selective incentives, their membership is not contingent upon
political considerations, and their individual contributions have
little political impact."'1
This simple fact sets up an agency
problem when union leaders represent union members before
government. The interests of union leaders may not align with
union members, and members may not pay close attention to this
fact. Remember, though, this is not unique to labor unions.
Business association leaders also diverge in representation of
members, although they diverge toward the wealthier interests.
Leaders of unions tend to diverge in beliefs from their
members. Leaders tend to believe strongly in the union as part
of the labor movement. 6 9 In a study of members of Ohio unions,
it was found that while a plurality of members stated they
belonged to the Democratic Party, at the same time, the members
believed approximately two-thirds of leadership identified with

166 AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supra note 146, at 47; see also TERRY M. MOE,
THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF
POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 172 (1980).
167 MOE, supra note 166, at 173.
1`s Id. at 174-75.
161 Id. at 175.
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the Democratic Party.1 70
Anecdotal evidence supports this
divergence as well.
A labor attorney, Thomas Geoghegan,
reports one union member expressing: "The guys who start out
running for Union office? Don't trust them. They're out for
themselves."'
The union member suggests there are some good
ones, but that most are motivated by self-interest.
Many labor scholars discuss the question of whether unions
themselves are democratic. This issue relates directly to whether
the union mirrors the will of those it represents. In the 1950s, at
the height of union power, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman published
a seminal study on union democracy by examining the
International Typographical Union-the only union at the time
with a two-party system.172 Lipset and coauthors were impressed
with ITU's democracy.
However, they ultimately found it
unlikely that democracy would prevail in most unions."7
They
believed that large organizations simply did not permit the pure
democracy envisioned by theorists."'
Despite this critical
assessment of the possibility of democracy within unions, the
authors still concluded that unions were important elements of
maintaining some level of democracy in a polyarchy.1 7 5
More modern studies have considered the same question and
have found the Lipset determination too constraining on the
definition of democracy and too pessimistic."' They have found
that many unions use some important democratic features to
make their decisions. Nevertheless, it is by no means clear that
unions operate like the New England town democracy of Robert
Dahl.' 7 As is to be expected, a small group of individuals tend to
make the decisions of these organizations and that small group of
leaders' ideology likely differs in some part from a large portion
of the union's membership. Nevertheless, labor union members
AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS, supranote 146, at 47-64.
THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON?: TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR
WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK 183 (1991).
172 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET ET AL.,
UNION DEMOCRACY: THE INTERNAL
POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 3 (1956).
173 Id. at 403.
170

171

174
175

Id.
Id. at 413.

176 Tom Langford, Union Democracy as a Foundationfor a ParticipatorySociety:

A Theoretical Elaboration and Historical Example, 76 LABOUR/LE TRAVAIL 79, 8283 (2015).
177 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN
AN AMERICAN CITY (2d ed. 2005).
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probably have more democratic rights than any other members of
a nonprofit organization because of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act."" That Act provides a Bill of
Rights to union members ensuring them democratic procedures
in the operation of the union.
Implications for a Model To Judge Political Voice Equality

D.

I adopt the intrinsic equality principle as the basis of a
model to assess current policy. There is no one better than each
individual to decide for herself how her life should be governed.
While many in our society today think of one person, one vote as
the defining principle of a modern representative democracy, the
intrinsic equality principle demands more.17 9 A principle of one
person, one political voice is more descriptive of that ideal model.
As we assess our U.S. system, we should strive toward political
voice equality. The key here is, in assessing political fairness, we
should be maximizing a social choice function rather than a
social welfare function. The question in political fairness is not
whether a person realized a particular governance decision
outcome, but whether her political voice was respected as a part
of the political process. This model means that in evaluating the
question of labor union tax policy we should care more about
whether labor union tax policy enhances political voice equality
than whether it results in a better economic environment for
society.
Political voice equality in a small groiup would be relatively
easy to assess. We could use some process like Robert's Rules of
Order to ensure everyone in the group had her voice respected in
decision making.
However, in a polyarchy the question of
political voice equality becomes much more difficult to
determine. 8 o In part, political voice equality is found in the
exercise of the vote in free and fair elections to determine
representatives who will discuss and determine final policy for
our polity. However, elections do not provide complete political
voice opportunities. Citizens depend largely upon interest groups
Establishing an unbiased interest
to fulfill that function.'
118 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C.
531 (2012).

"7

UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note 1, at 36.
See supra Part III.A.
181 See discussion supra Introduction.
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system is difficult because it is hard to determine the different
types of distinct interests in existence, who a group is acting for,
how effective any group might be at having its voice heard, how
representative of a group an interest group might be, and how to
determine what that interest system should look like over time.
Nevertheless, we have many guideposts that can help us
make a determination regarding political voice equality. For
instance, collective action theory provides a way of assessing
which interests will face the most severe collective action
challenges. Additionally, extensive studies illustrate the ebb and
flow of the interest group sector over time and we can compare
that to the total population. While these various theoretical and
empirical strategies do not allow us to be precise in any way in
policy choices, they do help to sketch out the broad outlines of a
biased system. That sketch should at least aid us in thinking
about the public policy we adopt so that we can try to build a
policy that does not exacerbate the bias of that system. We
might even, under certain circumstances, work to ameliorate that
bias where the considered judgment of theory and empirical
evidence is that the bias is stark.
Thus, with labor unions, theory predicts labor interests will
be underrepresented in our democratic system. Theory also
predicts many wealthy business interests will not suffer such
collective action problems such that there will be a bias in the
interest system of business as compared to labor. The evidence
suggests this bias is real, increasing, and stark.1 8 2 We could look
deeper to see if in fact policy preferences indeed tilt away from
the general interests of labor, but under the social choice function
model adopted here, there is no need to further assess that
matter. Based on the fact that labor is broadly left out of the
political discussion, particularly when compared with that of
business, we could embark on policy choices to change that
reality.

182

See discussion supra Part III.B.
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IV. LABOR UNIONS: HISTORY AND TAX LAW
A.

Very Brief History

Labor associations in a sense have been a part of the United
In examining this history, it is
States since its inception.
worthwhile to make a distinction between trade associations and
trade unions. A trade association, which I have referred to above
as a business association or business league, is typically made up
of independent businessmen who are trying to protect the price of
the goods or services that they sell. 18 3 Trade unions, which I have
referred to here as labor unions, are made up of wage earners
who organize to earn better wages and better working
conditions." Trade unions began forming in in the late 1700s.'
In 1792, a society of Philadelphia shoemakers in 1792 formed the
first trade union in the United States;186 it did not last a year.
The early unions were made up of trades such as cordwainers,
printers, and tailors, and seemed to be associated with a growing
ability to mass produce goods. 8 7
A major roadblock to forming trade unions at the time was
that they were generally illegal under U.S. law. For instance,
New York cordwainers were convicted of conspiracy to raise
wages and operating a closed shop. 8 8 Journeymen tailors in
Philadelphia were similarly convicted in 1827.'
In 1840,
though, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that it was not
illegal for laborers to so organize. This was a legal turning point
for labor. 9 0
The United States was largely made up of farmers at the
time.1 9 ' In 1820, farmers comprised 71.8% of our workforce.19 2
The growth of labor unions appears to be connected to
industrialization in the North. Between 1860 and 1870, factory
"a TAFT, supra note 106, at 3.
184

Id.

Id.; SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 1 (rev.
ed., Longmans, Green & Co., 1920).
I TAFT, supra note 106, at 5.
187 Id. at 3-5.
185

188 Id. at 10.
189

Id.

190 Id. at 11.
191 RUSSELL 0. WRIGHT, CHRONOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 4

(2003).
192
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workers increased from 1.3 million to 2 million. 19 3 For the first
time, there were more factory workers than farmhands.1 94 At
this point, there were a total of 5.5 million non-farm workers
with a population of 35.2 million people in the country.19 5 The
country's first national labor union, called the National Labor
Union, was organized in 1866.1" Still, until the formation of the
American Federation of Labor ("AFL") in 1886, national
unionization efforts were neither cohesive nor effective.' 9 The
signal success of the union organization effort of the AFL was
that it was based on organizing groups of skilled individuals that
had commonality and who were interested in protecting their
particular wage. 98

Labor unions saw their greatest rise in the period between
1897 and 1904. During that time union membership increased
from 477,000 to 2,072,000 members. 199 This period also appears
to be an apex of the fight for the closed shop. 200 Business
associations and the government reacted strongly to this effort
and stemmed the tide starting in 1904 when Theodore Roosevelt
and the National Association of Manufacturers led the effort
against unions.2 0 '
Union membership rates then remained
relatively stable between 1935 and 1945.202 Not insignificantly,
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935, making collective
bargaining a policy of the United States. 203 The United States
Supreme Court found the Act constitutional in 1937; union
membership increased by fifty-seven percent that year.2 04 The
Act gave many protections to unions and included in its
provisions the right to a closed shop.

'9' PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN
AMERICA 71 (2010).
194

Id.

195

Id.

196

Id.at 75.

'7

TRUMAN, supra note 75, at 4, 68.

198

Id.

199

COLLECTIVE ACTION,

*0 Id. at 78.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 79.
203 Id.
204 Id.

supra note 18, at 77.
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In the 1950s, union membership achieved its greatest
However, as
membership in relation to the workforce.2 05
discussed above in Part III, union membership has had its most
significant decline over the past thirty years. Many forces have
played a role in this decline, including structural changes in our
economy, bad political instincts of labor union leaders, aggressive
employers successfully utilizing anti-union tactics, and even a
lessening of support among workers for unions. Nevertheless,
scholars have little agreement on the real cause. 2 0 This trend
does seem to be universal across nations, but the decline in the
United States is particularly significant.2 07
B.

Tax Exempt Requirements for Labor Unions

Congress exempted labor unions from tax first in the Tariff
Act of 1909.208
In its initial drafting, the Senate Finance
Committee did not include the phrase "labor organization."2 0 9
After labor unions complained, however, Congress added the
phrase "labor organization" to the statute.21 0 It appears that
labor unions complained in part because they were worried that
the taxation of insurance companies would ensure that labor
unions that engaged in some insurance activities would be
subject to tax under the Code.21 1 Congress maintained the
exemption of labor unions in the 1913 Income Tax Act and
additionally added the terms we know today of labor,
agricultural, and horticultural organizations.21 2 I focus only on
the labor portion of the statute. Agricultural and horticultural
organizations bear much more in common with trade associations
exempt under Section 501(c)(6) of the Code.213
To qualify under Section 501(c)(5), a labor union: (1) may not
allow its earnings to inure to the benefit of its members, and (2)
must "have as [its] objects the betterment of the conditions of
those engaged in such pursuits, the improvement of the grade of
205 UNHEAVENLY CHORUS, supra note
20
207

Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.

1, at 87.

Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 (exempting "labor organization[s]").
44 CONG. REC. 4148-49 (1909) (statement of Sen. Burkett).
210 See, e.g., 44 CONG. REC. 4154 (1909); 44 CONG. REc. 4155 (1909).
211 James J. McGovern, The Exemption Provisionsof SubchapterF, 29 TAX
LAW.
523, 530-31 (1976) (citing 44 CONG. REc. 4149, 4154, 4155 (1909)).
212 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat.
172.
21s Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 353 n.148.
208

209
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their products, and the development of a higher degree of
efficiency in their respective occupations."2 14 A labor union must
serve individuals who are considered to be "labor."2 15 Thus, for
instance, an organization of "drivers, trainers, and horse owners,
most of whom are independent contractors or entrepreneurs," did
"not qualify for exemption as a labor [union]."216
Courts have interpreted the term "labor organization"
liberally to ensure the protection of labor interests.21 7 In that
vein, the IRS found an apprenticeship committee organized
primarily to establish standards in skilled crafts, determine the
qualifications necessary to become a journeyman, and aid in
adjusting and settling disputes between the employer and the
apprentice, qualified as a labor union.21 8
Typical exempt activities of a labor union include collective
bargaining, 219 publishing labor newspapers, 2 20 allocating work
assignments among union members, 22 1 and providing litigation
222Atec
A teacher's association that
support to controlling unions.
"sponsors seminars and courses for its members, participates in
teacher conventions, bargains collectively and processes
grievances, and keeps its members informed of its activities
through regular meetings and a newsletter," qualifies as a labor
union. 223

Under IRS guidance, a union can maintain a pension plan
and qualify as a labor union.2 24 While IRS guidance prohibits a
pension plan from qualifying as a labor union by itself, there is a
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1(a) (1997).
Rev. Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153.
216 Rev. Rul. 78-288, 1978-2 C.B. 179; see also Rev. Rul. 74-167, 1974-1 C.B.
134
("[I]nclusion of some self-employed persons in the membership of a qualified labor
[union] does not affect the organization's exempt status.").
217 Portland Coop. Labor Temple Ass'n v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 450 (1939).
218 Rev. Rul. 59-6, 1959-1 C.B. 121.
219 Rev.
Rul. 77-154, 1977-1 C.B. 148 (Nurses' association "whose primary
activity is acting as a collective bargaining agent for its members qualifies .. . .").
220 Rev. Rul. 68-534, 1968-2 C.B. 217 (Labor union that publishes a newspaper
providing information on union activity is performing an exempt function).
22' Rev. Rul. 75-473,
1975-2 C.B. 213 ("[O]rganization, controlled and funded
jointly by a labor union and an employer association, that operates a dispatch hall to
allocate work assignments among union members and engages in other activities
appropriate to a labor union qualifies. . . ").
222 Rev. Rul. 74-596,
1974-2 C.B. 167 (Organization that provides supporting
litigation activities, proper for any one of its member unions, directed to the
betterment of conditions for public employees qualifies).
22
Rev. Rul. 76-31, 1976-1 C.B. 157.
224 Rev. Rul. 62-17, 1962-1 C.B.
87.
214
215
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circuit split on the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit recognized that a pension plan managed
jointly by an employer and a union qualifies as an exempt labor
union.2 2 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, however, agreed with the IRS that a foreign pension fund
similarly controlled by an employer and a union did not
qualify.2 26 The court reasoned that the pension fund was neither
controlled by nor represented traditional labor unions.
A labor union may not operate a business as an exempt
purpose even if the business is there to solely employ members
and turn over all profits to the labor union.2 27 Similarly, an
organization controlled by private individuals that offers strike
insurance does not qualify under Section 501(c)(5).2 2 8 Providing
ministerial services for labor unions, such as creating an
organization holding employment taxes,22 9 or establishing
savings accountS 230 for union members, are not validly exempt
labor union activities.
The tax law does not impose significant restrictions or
disclosure obligations on labor unions. Labor law, however,
places significant restrictions and disclosure obligations that
treat labor unions worse in many ways than business
associations. Under tax law, labor unions may lobby before
legislative bodies. 23 1
Like social welfare organizations and
business leagues, tax law does not require labor unions to
publicly disclose its donors. 23 2 However, the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act requires labor unions to disclose all
Morganbesser v. United States, 984 F.2d 560, 563-64 (2d Cir. 1993).
Stichting
Pensioenfonds
Voor
de
Gezondheid,
Geesteijke
en
Maatschappelijke Belangen (PGGM) v. United States, 129 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998); see also Tupper v. United States, 134 F.3d
444, 444-45 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that a pension plan controlled by an employer
and a union did not qualify for exemption as a labor union).
227 Rev. Rul. 69-386, 1969-2 C.B. 123.
228 Rev.
Rul. 76-420, 1976-2 C.B. 153; cf Rev. Rul. 67-7, 1967-1 C.B. 137
([O]rganization established by a labor union to provide strike and lockout benefits to
its members is a labor union).
229 Rev. Rul. 66-354, 1966-2 C.B. 207.
225
226

22

Rev. Rul. 77-46, 1977-1 C.B. 147.

Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-1 C.B. 328.
A labor union must file a Form 990 and attach a schedule B, Schedule of
Contributors. That schedule requires a labor union to disclose its substantial donors,
who are typically those who donate more than $5,000. However, unlike the Form
990, which is publicly disclosed, the IRS does not publicly disclose labor union
schedule B.
231

232
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sources of income in excess of $5,000.233 Under tax law, a labor
union may intervene in a political campaign as long as it does not
become a primary activity."' Federal election law, though,
prohibits a labor union from spending its treasury funds on such
political campaigns.23 5 A labor union might owe a tax under
section 527(f) for any expenditures it makes on political
campaign activity.3 To avoid this tax and comply with federal
election law, the union can set up a segregated fund that is
effectively a Political Action Committee under Section 527.237
Most unions must file a Form 990 disclosing information
regarding its financial activities. 2 38 The Form 990 is disclosed
publicly. Nevertheless, because labor unions must disclose so
much to the Department of Labor, such as its donors, and to the
Federal Election Commission, the Form 990 information is
probably less important for the public than that form is for
organizations like charities or even business associations.
As discussed in Part I above, labor unions receive a subsidy
from the exemption from tax because they are able to defer taxes
to a later year. While there is no charitable contribution
deduction for union dues, dues are deductible under Section 162
as a business expense. Nevertheless, in many instances union
members may not be able to deduct this expense. A union
member in most instances is restricted in deducting dues because
dues are an itemized deduction and also a miscellaneous
itemized deduction subject to the two percent floor.2 39
V.

RATIONALES FOR

TAx EXEMPTION

Few scholars have considered the rationale for labor union
tax exemption. One author suggests that the exemption of labor
unions may have
been built upon a principle
of
23` 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2012). Extensive reports about the financial activities
of
labor unions are available on the Department of Labor website, at https://olms.dolesa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
234 JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, IRS C.P.E., POLITICAL

CAMPAIGN

AND

LOBBYING

ACTIVIIEs

OF

IRC

501(c)(4),

(C)(5),

AND

(C)(6)

ORGANIZATIONS L-1, L-2 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tegeleotopicl03.pdf; cf.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1 (1960) (fails to list intervening in a political campaign as a
valid purpose of a labor organization).
5 11 C.F.R. § 114.4 (2015).
26 26 U.S.C.A. § 527 (West 2014).
23

REILLY & BRAIG ALLEN, supra note 234, at L-6.

-8 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033 (West 2014).
"9 Halperin, supra note 25, at 163; see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 307.
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nondiscrimination.o
After choosing to exempt trade
associations, Congress may have felt compelled to provide a
similar exemption to labor as well. 2 4 1 The general sense though
is that exemption for labor unions is a divergence from normal
tax law, such that to the extent there is income earned in the
labor union that is not taxed, it is a subsidy to the union and its
members.
The earliest consideration of labor union tax exemption
appears to be by Neale M. Albert and Sanford I. Hansell, who
expressed concern about providing a subsidy to an entity that
was becoming particularly powerful and might cause harm to the
economy.24 2 They found that labor unions seemed to generally
deserve exemption as a legal matter, at least under the system
established by Congress. However, they worried that the power
of labor was beginning to threaten our system of free enterprise
and skew the labor versus capital collective-bargaining
arrangement.
Thus, they argued Congress should consider
limiting the tax favorability of the labor union tax system.
Although they thought taxing a union on union dues payments
inequitable, they thought taxing either investment income
broadly, or dividends more narrowly, could be supported.24 3
Lawrence Stone also believed that labor unions should not be
exempt from tax.2 " Stone suggested that while we may not miss
the right normative tax result by too much, it probably would be
easier to handle some thorny issues of taxation of these
organizations under a cooperative model instead.2 45 David Miller
more recently agreed with this basic assessment, and argued we
should tax labor unions just like we tax social clubs: tax
investment income and nonmember income. 24

240
241

McGovern, supra note 120, at 531.

Id.

m Neal M. Albert & Sanford I. Hansell, The Tax Status of the Modern Labor
Union, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 137, 153 (1962).
m Id. at 160.
2" Lawrence M. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt
Organizations:The Need for a National Policy, 20 U. So. CAL. TAx INST. 27 (1968).
2 Id. at 58-60.

m David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizationsand Their
Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 452 (2014).
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George Rahdert and Boris Bittker cursorily considered the
rationale for labor unions. 2 47 As a mutual benefit organization,
established to support their members, they believed that any
income earned by the organization should be allocated to the
members and then taxed to them. 2 48 They seemed little bothered
by labor union tax exemption because almost all expenses of a
labor union would be deductible to union members; the primary
benefit of tax exemption would be a matter of deferral.2 49
Halperin reviewed the exemption of mutual benefit
organizations and found that in the context of business related
nonprofits, tax exemption provided a deferral benefit that should
probably be eliminated.2 50 He believed that elimination should
extend to labor unions even though they presented a more
sympathetic claim for exemption. 25 1 He did not think the amount
of money involved substantial because of the fact that almost all
the money spent by a labor union would be a deductible amount.
With the exception of Albert and Hansell, who recommended
changing policy because of the negative societal effects they
perceived coming from labor unions, the above approaches focus
on whether labor unions should be taxed based on whether the
activity generates taxable income or not. A couple of economists
have approached the rationale of tax exemption from an
economic efficiency point of view. These analyses generally
assume that tax exemption provides a subsidy.
Although neither has spoken directly on the issue of tax
exemption for labor unions, their thought is instructive in
thinking about the question. Henry Hansmann argues that the
nonprofit sector tends to provide goods and services that are
undersupplied in our economy because of contract failure.2 52
Burton Weisbrod argued that we should not only expect underinvestment in collective goods by the private sector, but that we
should also expect underinvestment from the public sector, and
For Weisbrod, the nonprofit sector
government as well.2 53
provides goods and services where there is government failure.
For both Hansmann and Weisbrod, tax exemption is one possible,
247
248
24
250
21
252
211

Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 354-55.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 354.
Halperin, supra note 25, at 166.
Id. at 163.
Hansmann, supra note 13, at 67-69.
See generally Weisbrod, supra note 14.
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if flawed, way of remedying the undersupply of these identified
goods. Collective goods, sometimes called public goods, consist of
those goods or services that once provided to one, cannot be
excluded from any.25 4
He argues that
Hansmann focuses on market failure.
nonprofit firms are likely the most efficient provider of certain
goods and services subject to significant contract failure.2 55 By
contract failure, he means those goods or services whose
provision does not happen at an optimal level because of some
market failure, such as asymmetric information. For instance,
the provision of goods or services to poor people on behalf of
donors is subject to substantial contract failure because the
purchaser-the donor-cannot easily confirm that the goods or
services are delivered to the poor person. Thus, we should expect
fewer donations to charitable organizations serving the poor than
is optimal. Nonprofit firms, he suggests, are the most efficient
providers in such contract failure situations.25 6 Finally, the
subsidy provided by tax exemption is well matched to nonprofit
needs because nonprofits do not have access to equity markets
and the tax subsidy helps ease that burden.2 57
Hansmann does not claim that this rationale is a strong one,
only a sufficient one.2 55 He believes that, on economic efficiency
grounds, we should be slightly better off with the capital subsidy
of tax exemption.2 5 9 Hansmann suggests that a useful method for
assessing whether nonprofits make more sense within an
industry is to observe whether there is a for-profit counterpart in
that industry. That there is a large for-profit contingent in the
industry is evidence that the nonprofit firm may not be the most
efficient provider of the service or good. However, it is not
conclusive evidence.
While Hansmann does not apply his theory to labor unions,
he does consider its application to mutual nonprofits generally.
He argues that social clubs, such as country clubs, likely do not
face capital formation challenges.26 0 Country clubs and other
such organizations are easily able to attract the funds they need
2%
5
2
257
258

259
26

COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 18, at 14-15.
Hansmann, supra note 13, at 70.
Id. at 74.
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Id. at 92.
Id. at 94.
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for their operations. He also believes they do not really suffer
from a contract failure. It is not clear how Hansmann would
apply his analysis to labor unions. I will turn to this in my
analysis towards the conclusion of the Article.
Weisbrod developed a simplistic model of a society with a
private for-profit sector and a public governmental sector.26 1 He
assumes that in any society, for-profit firms will tend to provide a
certain amount of private goods. The government, in turn, will
provide a certain amount of collective goods.262
Weisbrod
assumes, though, that the government will never provide an
optimal level of collective goods; it will only provide the level
desired by the median voter. Although private firms may provide
some private goods that are collective good substitutes, they will
never be sufficient.2 6 3 He argues that public subsidy of voluntary
behavior can work to supply collective goods that meet the needs
of the non-median voter.2 64 This theory is typically referred to as
the government failure theory. Weisbrod did not consider the
impact of his theory on the question of labor unions.
In a political justification, some, including justices of the
United States Supreme Court, have argued that nonprofits foster
pluralism.2 65
There is a strong traditional sense that the
nonprofit sector is a place for experimentation and the generation
and dissemination of ideas that are critical to a healthy
democracy.
This American love of voluntary associations
fulfilling this deeply democratic purpose was noticed by Alexis de

Weisbrod, supra note 14, at 27.
Id. at 23.
2
Id.at 11.
264 Id. at 30-32; see also John R. Brooks, Quasi-PublicSpending, 104 GEO. L.J.
1057, 1078 n.87 (2016) (discussing the nature of public goods, collective goods, and
private goods, and the lack of a clear-cut definition between these items).
265 BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.4 (11th ed.
2016); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609-10 (1983) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (describing the "role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse,
indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints"); see also LESTER M.
261
262

SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999); John W.
Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT ix, xiii-xv (Brian

O'Connell ed. 1983); Elizabeth T. Boris & Matthew Maronick, Civic Participation
and Advocacy, in THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 394 (Lester M. Salamon ed.,

2d ed. 2012).
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Tocqueville, who wrote with admiration of the American
tendency to form associations to accomplish all sorts of objects
that might typically have been left to the government.2 6 6
There are scholars who generally support a vibrant
voluntary nonprofit sector. Theda Scokpol, for instance, believes
that nonprofits of a voluntary membership nature serve an
important democratic-enhancing role.26 7 Her work documents
that through the 1950s, the United States was supported by
cross-class voluntary associations that tended to make the
United States a more democratic nation. 26 8 However, since the
1960s, these cross-class voluntary associations have greatly
diminished in favor of professionally-run associations supported
by the money of elites and private foundations."
This has
resulted in a crowding out of the issues of middle class and poor
citizens, she suggests. 2 70
I have argued in the past that to determine whether a
nonprofit should be exempt from the corporate income tax, we
need a theory for why we would apply the income tax to a
nonprofit corporation in the first place.2 71 In order to find that
there is any subsidy to the nonprofit, we must believe that a tax
should apply to the entity. There are only two likely theories to
support the taxation of nonprofits: (1) the shareholder theory,
and (2) the real entity/regulatory theory. Neither theory provides
significant support for taxing charitable organizations as
currently constructed. However, both theories generally support
applying a tax to mutual benefit organizations. In terms of other
tax exempt interest groups, I previously argued that trade
associations do not suffer substantial market failure, and are
therefore undeserving of a subsidy.2 72 In that article, I left open
the possibility that labor unions might be deserving of the
subsidy. In Part VI, I turn to analyze that matter.
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VI. ANALYSIS: LABOR UNION TAX TREATMENT ASSESSED UNDER
A POLITICAL FAIRNESS MODEL

In addition to economic fairness and efficiency, we should
consider the value of democracy and, particularly, political voice
equality in assessing our income tax policy. Generally, political
fairness should only be one of many factors for consideration in

evaluating tax policy. On most matters of the definition of
income, for instance, political voice equality should likely play a
very limited role. It should play a greater role in a consideration
of how much progressivity to adopt, as well as the proper rate of

tax. However, where tax policy directly impacts political voice
equality, it should be a major factor in the assessment. The
principle of intrinsic equality should not be overridden by
principles of economic fairness or economic efficiency in these
circumstances.

Furthermore, given the fundamental nature of

this right to govern ourselves, we should consider ending any tax
policy that directly exacerbates political voice inequality.
By "directly impacts political voice equality," I mean a tax
policy that immediately applies

to an organization's

or an

individual's expression of political voice in our democracy. Thus,
on one hand, the deduction of payments or receipts to or from
political groups, or the taxation of the income of political groups,
directly impacts. political voice equality. Partnership taxation, on

the other hand, would generally not directly impact political
voice equality.
The taxation of interest group activity directly impacts
political voice.
Whether you look at the taxation of an
individual's payments or receipts to or from an interest group, or

the taxation of the interest group itself, the choice will either
encourage or discourage the activity of exercising political voice.
Thus, on the issue of tax exemption for nonprofits generally, and

taxation impacting labor unions specifically, I believe we should
consider the important value of political voice equality.
In assessing the deductibility of labor union dues and the
propriety of labor union tax exemption, there are two primary
questions-one descriptive and one normative: (1) Does income

tax policy incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor
unions?; and (2) Should tax policy incentivize the formation and
maintenance of labor unions? The second question can be broken

into three branches: (a) In isolation, should we incentivize labor
unions?; (b) If all other political interest groups are similarly
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incentivized, should labor unions receive that incentive also?;
and, finally, (c) Should we incentivize some interests more than
others?
On the first question, as I discuss more below, we likely
penalize the formation and maintenance of labor unions. As to
the second question, tax policy should at least be neutral as to
the matter of interest groups, and could be structured to provide
additional incentives to labor unions. This means that if all
other groups are provided tax exemption and the ability to allow
their members to deduct dues payments, labor unions and their
members should be extended the same treatment. However,
political fairness would be enhanced by eliminating tax
exemption for all interest groups and extending the deductibility
of dues above the line to labor union members. Finally, although
there are problems with the final case, we could justify
eliminating tax exemption for business interests while extending
it to labor interests.27 3
A.

Does Income Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity?

Tax exemption for labor unions and the deductibility of labor
union dues appear to be the only two tax policies that might
directly impact labor interests in formation and maintenance. As
developed in Part I, it appears that tax exemption provides a
modest subsidy, but that the deduction of union dues leads to
something of a penalty to the payment of union dues.
The government provides a small subsidy to labor unions
through tax exemption based primarily on deferral of amounts
that would be deductible in a future year. 2 74 Although small, this
subsidy is likely enhanced by other state and local tax benefits
like property tax exemption that often flow from obtaining tax
exempt status.27 5 Still, the benefit appears to be available only
sporadically to the most successful labor unions.
I say
"sporadically" because unions likely rarely experience profits; it
is likely that only larger unions are either able to sell products
I do not address here how to think about interest groups that are social
welfare organizations or charitable organizations. The political fairness analysis
constructed here based on collective action challenges is not as immediately
applicable to an organization that is generally bankrolled by some wealthy
individual. I hope to turn to this challenge in a later paper.
274 26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West
2014).
27 Bazil Facchina et al., Privileges & Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit
Organizations,28 U. S.F. L. REV. 85, 104-05 (1993).
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like insurance to its members and nonmembers to generate
profits, or are able to actually earn investment income. As tax
exemption is constructed, the subsidy never reaches those
interests that face the most severe collective action challenges
because they never organize.
As for the deductibility of union dues, we penalize the
payment of union dues rather than subsidize it. The normal
income tax policy provides that the association dues one pays for
one's job are deductible from income. Union dues are technically
deductible under the Code as a business expense.2 76 However,
our income tax treats union dues payments to the worst possible
treatment, a miscellaneous itemized deduction.2 7 7 Given that in
a normal income tax we would allow the deduction of union dues,
to' primarily deny the deduction is in effect to penalize the
activity. In fairness, Congress adopted a generous standard
deduction to eliminate the need of people to deduct many
expenses such as union dues. 2 78 However, the fact that union
dues are considered a miscellaneous itemized deduction further
penalizes the activity. Nevertheless, the result of this policy is
that we do not incentivize the payment of union dues, and could
be thought to penalize the payment of union dues. A laborer
would be better off paying a mortgage and property taxes on his
house or making a charitable contribution 27 9 than paying union
dues. This means that rather than subsidizing the formation of
labor unions, we discourage the joining of labor unions and
maintaining union membership.
The comparison of the labor interest tax treatment to the
business interest tax treatment is instructive too.
A
businessman who wants to join a trade association will often be
able to deduct the trade association amount above the line, thus
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26 U.S.C.A. § 162 (West 2014).

26 U.S.C.

§ 67 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(i).

John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the
Conflict Between Progressivity and Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 203, 205
(2011).
279 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2012) treats interest deductions and charitable contribution
deductions as itemized deductions, rather than miscellaneous itemized deductions.
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guaranteeing the deduction in a large percentage of
circumstances.2 80 Thus, we generally encourage the joining of
business interest groups.
This comparison point is important in the tax exemption
sense as well. We provide business interests the same tax
exemption opportunity we provide to labor interests. Because
the models of business interests can differ greatly from the labor
interest, it is likely that business interests can make much better
use of the tax exemption per capita. Unions primarily generate
money from member dues. Those dues are not going to differ
Business interests, though, often charge
wildly in amount.
sliding scale fees that allow them to generate particularly big
contributions from wealthy members. Additionally, they can sell
various products such as industry codes that allow them
The American Medical
significant opportunities for profit.
Association ("AMA") for instance controls and sells the very
profitable codes for medical billing associated with Medicare."'
This means business interest's members are not penalized for
making contributions to a trade association, and that business
interests themselves are likely able to generate a larger more
Thus, we incentivize
regular benefit from tax exemption.
business interests to form interest groups more than we do labor
interests.
Should Tax Policy Incentivize Labor Union Activity?
That brings us to the second question. Should we use income
tax policy to incentivize the formation and maintenance of labor
unions? This question has three subquestions: (i) In isolation,
should we incentivize labor unions?; (ii) If we incentivize other
interest groups, should we incentivize labor interests too?; and
(iii) Would we be better off with a neutral system where all
interest groups face the same level of taxation or should, and can,
we build a system where some interests are incentivized over
others? In each instance, tax exemption is considered first, and
then the case of the deductibility of union dues.
B.

With many business interests being either entities or employers or small
businessmen their right to deduct is found in 26 U.S.C.A. § 62 (West 2014), meaning
they are ensured the deduction from gross income.
281 Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 321 (discussing the AMA's
sale of Current Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines how any
medical procedure is reimbursed by Medicare).
280
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1.

Labor Union Incentives in Isolation
Labor union revenue appears to bear all the characteristics
of taxable income.
A union is a separately recognized,
independent entity that carries on an activity that would be
taxed like any other business. While some have argued that
charitable organizations do not earn income in the sense we
think of income within the income tax,282 no one makes that
claim as to a labor union. Thus, in absence of some good
rationale, labor union income should generally be taxed. None of
the current theories of tax exemption provide a strong case to
support tax exemption for labor unions, or labor interests
generally.
We could approach the question of whether a labor union
deserves income tax exemption from an economic efficiency
perspective. The best support for such a case in nonprofit tax
exemption rationales is likely Hansmann's contract failure
theory based in an economic efficiency rationale. Labor interests
face a contract failure because of the collective action problem
common to large groups where the return from joining is
relatively small compared to the cost of joining. Additionally,
labor unions are created in the nonprofit form such that they
undergo some capital constraints. However, along with the fact
that Hansmann's theory provides no real limiting principle,2 8
many explicitly make the case that labor unions are harmful in
an economic efficiency sense.2 8 We could get into a battle over
the economic efficiency impact of labor unions, but I believe there
is a more satisfying rationale based in the political fairness of the
matter.
Weisbrod's government failure theory has some promise too.
Perhaps labor union services are services that the government
does not provide, but are something a group of our society who
are not a majority desires. This is not a perfect fit either. Labor
unions are not an end good that might be provided by
government, but more of a government process in and of itself.
Even if we could find that labor unions provide a good that the
government fails to provide, this theory offers no reason for why
See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 22, at 307-14, 333.
Cf Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-ProfitCharities, 93 VA.
L. REV. 2017, 2066-67 (2007) (arguing for-profit organizations deserve a subsidy for
carrying out charitable works just like nonprofit organizations).
28
See supra note 2.
282
283
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we should believe this good should be supported by government.
Again, considering the situation from the political fairness angle
should offer some greater support.
Perhaps we could try to build a case for labor unions based
on a quid pro quo theory that labor unions provide some concrete
economic benefits to society. The difficulty with this path is that
there is evidence on the outcomes of unions on our society that
point in different directions. Some say unions help in growth and
in protecting laborers, while others find that they harm our
economy while protecting only a select few laborers.
Finally, there may be something in the pluralist argument.
Nonprofit organizations enhance the number of voices we find in
our political system, and thereby improve the deliberations of our
representative bodies by increasing the amount of political
voices. However, the claim of pluralism has never been deeply
developed.
The pluralist argument is based on a facile model of groupThis vision of pluralism suggests we
based democracy.2 8 5
encourage every interest to form to bring all possible voices to the
government. However, that case ignores the collective action
problem. Interests face varying levels of difficulty in organizing
and maintaining status and action. This means the provision of
a subsidy through exemption will likely never go to the groups
that arguably need it the most. The pluralist rationale also
ignores a lesser but important factor-whether groups represent
the "true" interests of the group members. Both theoretical and
empirical scholarship have shown that it is unlikely that groups
fulfill this role in a way we might hope. Those who argue that we
should support the entire nonprofit sector with tax exemption
because it will enhance "pluralism" fail to acknowledge these
deep imperfections.
although the nonprofit pluralists are
Nevertheless,
Much of our
misguided in part, their instincts are right.
nonprofit sector plays a significant role in our democratic
Social welfare organizations, labor unions, and
structure.
business leagues are all arguably primarily involved in shaping
Because of issues of
our democracy as interest groups.2 86
numerosity, individual citizens are rarely able to participate in
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Taxing the Unheavenly Chorus, supra note 15, at 270-72.
Charitable organizations do too, but do not typically do so in a primary sense.
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setting the agenda in our democracy of items for final votes. As
discussed above, interest groups tend to fill this important
democratic role on behalf of citizens. Thus, getting policy right
regarding these nonprofit organizations might be less about
economic efficiency, and more about getting democracy right. I
argue we should consider a neo-pluralist case for supporting
interest groups through tax exemption.
A major assumption of this case is that we should strive for
democracy rather than anarchy or guardianship. While this
assumption may seem self-evident, it is anything but. Founding
fathers, such as Madison and Hamilton, were deeply drawn to
some form of guardianship as the best form of government. The
Founders were particularly fearful of the laborers and farmers
exercising majoritarian power and tried to design our system of
representation to ensure mostly only "qualified individuals"
represented our people. This is ultimately what Federalist 10 is
about. Many continue to distrust the poor and working class to
participate in governing our democracy. This is seen in efforts to
limit voting rights as well as arguments that voters are not
educated well enough to vote. Additionally, while we may not
think of the United States as a strong bastion of anarchism,
there is a strong libertarian streak in this country that argues for
as limited a government as possible. That libertarian streak is
well expressed in those who would like to see the market control
most matters of distribution of goods and services. If you support
either of these cases, you are unlikely to agree with my case.
However, if you believe in the principle of intrinsic equality
discussed in Part II-that most adults have more right to govern
themselves than anyone else-then you should also generally
believe in the case for democracy. Accepting the principle of
intrinsic equality comes with a corollary that each of us should
have a right to participate in the governance of our group affairs.
Such a belief could lead to the idealistic notion of pure
democracy. Under that system, to be true to the principle of
intrinsic equality we would need to ensure that everyone
impacted by a group decision had the right to help set the agenda
of the group, receive information about the issues before the
group, help to provide information about the decisions before the
group, and have a right to vote on all final decisions. Obviously,
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as discussed in Parts II and III, we know the world has never
seen a pure democracy, and there are reasons to believe it is
unrealistic.
Still, as discussed in Part III, our notion of a democracy is
generally a polyarchy where certain critical rights such as
freedom of speech, association, and the right to regular free and
fair elections have become what we expect from democracy.
Factors such as size of the country or population, and differences
in wealth or ability, all create significant obstacles to pure
democracy, but also to a polyarchy. Ensuring equal political
voice
becomes
almost
an
impossibility
under
these
circumstances. But this does not mean we should not strive for
more political voice equality in our democracy.
While groups may not provide the perfect answer to this
problem of political voice inequality, it seems at least that they
are a part of a solution. For many people, groups provide their
only real opportunity to have a seat at the agenda-setting table.
And, the evidence is strong that labor interests are significantly
underrepresented.2 8 7 For the most part, laborers do not have a
seat at the agenda-setting table. Blue-collar workers and the
poor are thoroughly outgunned in the interest group sector by the
interests of executives and management and business
generally. 2 " As demonstrated in Part III.A, this is true whether
we look at interest group numbers, congressional hearing
testimony, or money spent on lobbying.
Whether this representation identifies a disparity in result is
beside the point. The political fairness model I propose focuses
on maximizing a social choice function, rather than a social
welfare function. In a democracy, we should strive to ensure
actual representation at the table of government. Labor is not at
the table. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable and just to
ensure that our tax system is not operated in a way to hinder the
formation of labor interests. Given the enormous disparity in
representation, it also seems reasonable and just to try to
subsidize such interests through the tax system.
Following this idea to its logical extreme might be
unworkable, though. To push the idea further, where a distinct
political interest faces substantial collective action problems, we

2
2

See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.B.
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could strive to aid those interests to organize and maintain
interest groups based on some sliding scale of collective action
difficulty.
The principle though is neither practical nor
administrable. It suggests that Congress or an agency should
assess the relative collective action challenge an interest faces
before providing a subsidy. Depending on the size of the group,
the education of interested parties, and the capital resources
available, we might ratchet up and down some scale that the
subsidy provided. We could even conceivably impose a tax on the
activity of interests that face no collective action problem to
hinder particularly powerful interests.
Adopting such a detailed system is likely to be less than
optimal when administrability, complexity, and political matters
are considered. In assessing an optimal commodity taxation
system where tax rose and fell based on the relative elasticity of
goods, Professor Eric Zolt concluded that such a system would
have too many informational demands, too much added
complexity, and likely political problems.2 89 A subsidy based on
the relative collective action problem of interests would face
similar problems. Given these constraints, if we wanted to build
such a system, we are probably better off making calls based on
rough justice regarding broad categories of groups, as Congress
has in effect already done.
If we look at labor union tax exemption in isolation, under a
rough justice, neo-pluralist view, the case for tax exemption for
unions seems, at first glance, strong. Given that labor interests
suffer a significant collective action problem and are poorly
represented in the interest group eco-system, there would seem
to be good reason to try to enhance their ability to organize and
maintain unions.
However, if we are looking at labor interests in isolation,
that is, not taking into consideration other interests such as
business interests, we might find a more troubling picture. The
subsidy of tax exemption is not targeted towards the interests
that need it the most. We would assist from year-to-year a very
narrow sector of the labor market. Even with the exemption,
unions will likely be a highly selective group of employees that
happen to be in sectors of the economy or country that are more
conducive to unions than others. While it may help some
"' Zolt, supra note 32, at 66-67.
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inchoate unions to organize and then maintain status, it probably
works to provide greater aid to those organizations that were
more likely to organize in the first place. Thus, standing in
isolation without considering the role of other groups in our
democracy and the incentives provided to them, it is hard to say
one way or the other whether a subsidy should be provided to
labor unions alone. I return to this question again in the final
part of the analysis in considering whether we should provide the
subsidy to labor when we take the subsidy away from buiness
interests.
What about the case for allowing the deductibility of union
dues? Because the basic income tax case for deductibility of
union dues is so strong, it's hard to imagine another justification.
However, given that union dues relate directly to political voice
equality, denying the deduction should be expected to cause
significant political unfairness. That inequality deepens when
we recognize that laborers face significant collective action
problems in organizing to protect their interests.
The neopluralist case, thus, strongly backs up the case to provide a
deduction for this expenditure. Perhaps, the ability to deduct
does not give a tax benefit to all who we might like; however, it
would seem odd to deny such a group of people this deduction.
2.

Exemption to Unions When Other Interests Are Extended
Exemption

In a world where other interests are subsidized through tax
exemption-this describes current tax policy-the case for
providing a similar tax exemption to labor interests becomes
strong. For instance, it would be highly questionable to provide
tax exemption to business and not to labor. Such a policy would
exacerbate political voice inequality that exists naturally
between business and labor. Thus, where business interests are
provided tax exemption, the neo-pluralist case would mean we
must provide the same right to labor. Failing to do so should be
expected to decrease the social choice function by reducing the
voice of laborers in our democracy.
Again, as in the prior case, it is hard to imagine an argument
prohibiting the deduction of labor union dues. Where other
interests may deduct such amounts, the case for allowing the
deduction of labor union dues would seem inescapable. Doing
otherwise would seem to be democratically suspect. Again, the
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choice to enhance the voice of business interests but not labor
interests should be expected to reduce the social choice function
in our democracy by systematically reducing the voice of labor.2 90
Such an unequal subsidy for political representation seems
antithetical to a balanced democracy.
Thus, if other interests receive tax exemption and
deductibility of interest group dues, labor unions should receive
the same treatment. This case may even provide a justification
for prohibiting the deduction of business interest dues, along
with any other interest that does not experience significant
collective action challenges. We already deny the deduction of
political contributions and explicit lobbying payments.2 91 In a
sense, a denial of business interest group dues could be an
extension of that policy. I turn to this question in Section 3.
Incentivize Labor Interests While Denying the Incentive to
Others
Where other interests are not subsidized through tax
exemption and are unable to deduct interest group dues, how
should we treat labor interests? To simplify this analysis, I
compare only the case of business interests and labor interests.
Under this scenario, we could either choose to deny tax
exemption to labor too, or exempt labor alone. We are able to
reasonably consider the taxing labor scenario in full in this
simplified analysis. This is because it treats everyone the same
by imposing the same taxing structure on all interest groups,
their members, and their potential members. The simplified
analysis for incentivizing labor and only comparing that to
business does not give us a complete picture. I hope in a future
article to consider more of the interest group sector in both social
welfare organizations and charitable organizations to more fully
consider this complex analysis. Finally, in each case, I assume
we want to increase the social choice function and that we take
political fairness in a democracy sense into consideration of this
tax policy because it directly impacts political voice equality.
3.

2m Obviously comparing only labor against business interests is a simplistic
analysis. We would need to throw in all sorts of other issues in order to have a full
sense of justice. However, the choices made in the Code are almost always some sort
of rough justice, and comparing labor to business provides us a simplistic way at
getting to this rough justice.
' 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(e) (West 2014).
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If what we want is government neutrality on the matter of
tax exemption, we should tax labor interests when business
interests are taxed. This would mean all income used to support
labor and business interests, whether those interests are
organized or remain unorganized, would face the same tax
structure choices currently offered by the Internal Revenue Code.
Such a change would mean either that we treat such
organizations as taxable corporations or treat them as
cooperatives taxable under Subchapter T. Those that never
organize would simply pay taxes on income that they might have
put towards organizing.
The key to this neo-pluralist case is that it would be a
positive democratic move to treat both interests as taxable rather
than tax-exempt. On the one hand, the subsidy of tax exemption
is given currently to business interests even though the vast
majority of those interests are well-represented and face little in
the way of collective action problems. They would organize
whether there was a subsidy or not. The subsidy to them is a
windfall and those interests are best placed to capture and use
the subsidy. Labor, on the other hand, is not well represented in
a political voice sense, and is little able to make use of the
subsidy even when available. Taxing both interests would place
both interests in the same relative position.
If we implemented such a change, labor unions would likely
pay little to no tax because they likely have little to no earnings.
Business interests would likely pay some tax associated with
their activities. Treating business and labor interests alike in
this way would be to treat the two in a tax neutral matter.
The neutral policy on dues would likely be to deny the dues
deduction to labor interests when business interests are denied
the deduction. Anyone engaging in interest group activity would
bear tax on their individual or entity level tax they otherwise
would owe. As it stands, the current policy primarily supports
the interest of businessmen. As noted above, Congress already
treats political campaign expenditures and lobbying expenditures
as non-deductible personal ones. There is no reason we could not
extend that notion into this very similar realm. Given that most
laborers are unable to take this deduction anyway, this would do
little to no harm to the labor union movement. It would also
move the government to a more neutral stance by not
incentivizing the business association interests over that of labor.
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The more difficult question in a justice sense is whether to
provide labor interests tax exemption and allow labor union
members the ability to deduct union dues, while denying the
same to business interests.
Although the subsidy for labor unions through tax exemption
is neither great in amount nor well-tailored, even marginal
improvements in the labor interest representation should
enhance our democracy because it would likely increase the
social choice function. If the modest subsidy administered in the
absence of a business interest subsidy results in even a couple
extra unions representing some group of laborers we would likely
have more individuals with a seat at the table for agenda-setting
and decision making. Still, denying the deduction to business
interests would likely lead to fewer business interests obtaining
representation as well, which would result in some lessening of
the social choice function. How do we reconcile that?
While it seems difficult to compare the results of this change
in policy, given the relative collective action problems of the two
different groups, it seems likely that business interests would
still be more generally represented before federal, state and local
governments than labor interests even after losing tax
exemption. Studies of the impact of removing exemption could be
useful. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that labor
interests are so hampered, while business interests are so
advantaged in comparison, that it is likely that providing the
subsidy to labor and not business would be social choice function
enhancing. Thus, I argue, we could legitimately maintain tax
exemption for labor interests in this case. For the reasons set
forth in Part VI.B.1 though, the case is not a strong one. There
are many interests who will never obtain the benefit of the
subsidy.
A stronger case can be made for allowing employees to
deduct labor union dues above the line while simultaneously
denying that right to business association members. Allowing a
deduction for labor union dues would be targeted exactly to
encourage membership in a union. This means this deduction
would be tailored to the choice of an employee to join and stay in
a labor union.
Providing this subsidy while denying it to
business interests could again increase the social choice function,
although still with the caveats listed above. Still, providing the
deduction to labor would not reach the interests that never
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organize and this creates its own political voice equality
problems. We may just be highlighting the voices of laborers who
already had a voice in the first place.
If someone were still inclined to try to utilize the exemption
and the deduction to enhance the social choice function, there is
still one other area to at least consider. Can we constitutionally
limit-or equalize-interest group expenditures through the tax
system to limit the power of wealthy voices-or equalize the
voices of everyone else?29 2 As noted in Part III, while the
fundamental rights-freedom of speech, free and fair electionsof a polyarchy are there to make political voice equality possible,
they do not work to make it a reality. While our Constitution
promises one person, one vote, and ensures freedom of speech
and association, it does not explicitly speak to establishing a
system to provide political voice equality. This is the debate we
see in campaign finance. Those who advocate for campaign
finance regulations often point out the harmful effect of wealth
on our democracy because it makes wealthy individuals' voices so
much more powerful than those of every day Americans. With
that said, the Supreme Court does not recognize equality as a
rationale for imposing campaign finance limitations.2 93
In Buckley v. Valeo the Court stated:
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which
was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of
information. from diverse and antagonistic sources'"and "'to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.' "294
Whether this opinion and its progeny puts a roadblock on how
the tax system is used to subsidize certain interests is an
important question that needs examination. I provide here only
initial thoughts.

RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 74-89 (2016); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 58-70 (1st ed. 2012) (considering this question with respect
292

to campaign contributions within campaign finance law).
293 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49
(1976).
294 Id. at 48-49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266
(1964)).
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The lesson of collective action theory and the empirical work
on interest group structure is that not all interests are created
equally.
Neutrality as to these matters means that some
interests will necessarily have a much louder voice at the table of
government than others. Many will have no voice at all. The
attitude of the Buckley Court on the First Amendment may very
well be the intent of the Framers, but it fails miserably as a
matter of achieving a stronger democracy and justice.2 95 How
does this opinion impact deductions and exemptions from tax?
The Court's use of the limits on equality principle as a
justification seems to be focused on provisions that either limit
campaign expenditures or limit campaign contributions.
Providing a deduction or not, and providing tax exemption or not,
has not been seen by the Court as the type of limitation that
campaign finance applies. In Cammarano v. United States, the
Court found that denying a deduction for lobbying expenses
harmed no First Amendment interest. 2 "
Furthermore, in
examining the question of whether a charitable organization
could be limited in its ability to lobby, the Court in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation again found no First Amendment
interest violated by limiting tax exemption based on the activity
of lobbying.2 97 The Court held that there was no equal protection
issue in subsidizing one interest more than another, such as
when Congress grants the benefit of accepting tax deductible
charitable contributions to veterans organizations, but not to
social welfare organizations. 29 8 Thus, it appears that the Court
has thus far willingly allowed tax exemption and tax deductions
to be established with political activity in mind.
This suggests that if Congress chooses to treat all interests
equally, it can. If it wants to subsidize some activity more than
another, it can do that too. It seems like the most difficult issue
295 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 58, at 360 ("The Court fails to recognize the
essential point that the fair value of the political liberties is required for a just
political procedure, and that to insure their fair value it is necessary to prevent
those with greater property and wealth, and the greater skills of organization which
accompany them, from controlling the electoral process to their advantage.").
296 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512-13 (1959).
297 Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 61
U.S. 540, 545-46 (1983).
29
Id. at 550-51; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Speech, and
Unconstitutional Conditions, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1045, 1064, 1071 (2014) (noting that
such a distinction is constitutional as long as the government has a rational basis,
and further finding this Taxation with Representation distinction limiting speech is
also constitutional because there is no lesser means of accomplishing the limitation).
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is whether it could subsidize some interest greater than
In other words, could it legitimately choose to
another.2 9 9
subsidize labor more than business interests, or vice versa.
Justice and democracy demand that Congress be allowed to give
a helping hand to interests that face great challenges in
projecting their voice in our democracy. I leave for another time
whether the Constitution permits that choice.
However,
Congress has at its disposal the ability to make a political voice
equality enhancing move by removing tax exemption from labor
and business and by taxing the dues of both labor and interest.
Another possible social choice function-enhancing move would be
to provide labor union members a deduction above the line for
union dues to equalize the treatment of business and labor
interests that are now out of balance in favor of business
interests. Under the neo-pluralist case current tax policy on
labor interests come up wanting.
CONCLUSION

Although the focus of this Article is on one small sector of the
tax world, laborers as an interest group, it uses that sector to
argue we should consider political fairness as a factor in tax
policy. It demonstrates that current policy on tax exemption
likely harms social choice function by enhancing the voice of
business and diminishing the voice of labor.
Although
traditionally we examine tax policy by considering its economic
fairness and efficiency, I argue we should consider the value of
political fairness when a tax policy directly implicates political
voice. In the case of labor union activity the tax policy of tax
exemption and the deduction of union dues directly impact
political voice.
A fundamental tenet of this political fairness analysis I
propose is that it focus on a social choice function. I contend that
the social choice function is key in this analysis because our tax
policy should be democracy enhancing rather than democracy
detracting. The primary question to ask therefore is whether a
particular policy increases political voice equality. Current policy
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on both exemption and the deduction of union dues likely
decreases political voice equality. We should therefore look to
change tax policy towards labor unions.
This Article presents a neo-pluralist justification for the
exemption from income tax provided for interest groups. The
original pluralism justification suggested we should support any
and all nonprofit organizations, no matter the cause, in order to
The neo-pluralist justification
enhance our democracy.
recognizes the deep impact of the collective action problem on the
interests in our society. In particular, those interests that are
vast in number, poor in wealth, and limited in political skill are
likely to face great difficulty in organizing to represent their
interests before our governments. Conversely, those interests
that are smaller, wealthy, and endowed with political skill are
likely to face little difficulty in organizing to represent their
interests.
This collective action problem is a significant
hindrance to advancing democracy.
Interest groups are
significant representatives of peoples' interests. We should not
adopt policies that make that democratic failure worse.
Currently, the Code appears to treat business and labor
Business
interests exactly the same under tax-exemption.
interests can form nonprofit tax-exempt organizations to further
their interests, and labor interests and the poor can do the same.
However, because of the problem of collective action, this system
overwhelmingly helps out the business interests and leaves the
interests of the workingman behind. We would enhance political
voice equality by ending exemption generally for labor unions
and trade associations. Although the case is not strong and is
subject to problems, we could legitimately choose to maintain it
for labor. Additionally, current policy that allows business
interests to deduct dues, but limits labor interests from
deducting the same, is unjust and harmful to our democracy. We
should either allow labor union members to deduct their union
dues above the line, or prohibit business interests from deducting
these expenses like we do to most labor union members. Either
choice would be preferable to current policy.
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